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ABSTRACT 
When it comes to employee privacy rights in emerging 
technologies, the times they are a-changin’. In the dawn of the 
modern technological era, when electronic mail and the Internet 
were in their relative infancy, the right to privacy meant almost 
nothing in the workplace. Employers could promise that e-mail 
would not be monitored, but then proceed to do so anyway. 
When employees sued, seeking vindication of their perceived 
privacy rights, courts cast aside any notion that an employee 
could expect privacy in the workplace, and they did so almost 
uniformly. The tide, however, appears to be turning. Judicial 
decisions rendered in more recent years, coupled with 
comparable statutory reform initiatives, suggest that as social 
norms shift in light of the rapid development and 
mainstreaming of modern technologies, the law is affording 
protection to employees that previously did not exist. This 
Article takes a retrospective-comparative approach to this 
turning tide, delving deeply into the law of the early era of 
modern technology and juxtaposing it against more recent 
developments. The result is exposition of an unmistakable trend 
favoring employee rights. This Article therefore tackles head-on 
the ultra-modern legal problem of workplace privacy rights in 
emerging technologies, but it does so in novel ways, as the first 
to suggest that the trend is shifting toward greater recognition 
of employee rights at the expense of employer prerogative. 
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Come senators, congressmen 
Please heed the call 
Don’t stand in the doorway 
Don’t block up the hall 
For he that gets hurt 
Will be he who has stalled 
There’s a battle outside 
And it is ragin’ 
It’ll soon shake your windows 
And rattle your walls 
For the times they are a-changin’.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The “ragin’ battle” in this case is not one that Bob Dylan 
contemplated. Indeed, no one alive at the time he first swooned 
those lyrics could have predicted the future that is now. The 
“battle” involves the likes of iPhones and iPads, Blackberries 
and laptops, Hotmail and Gmail, Facebook and Twitter—
technologies that could not even be fathomed fifty years ago, 
but which are pervasive parts of the American economy today.2 
Given their pervasiveness, it comes as no surprise that these 
technologies permeate the workplace.3 This is both a blessing 
                                                          
 1. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE 
A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1963), quoted in City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 
U.S. 746, 768 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority opinion 
for avoiding direct confrontation of the question of the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to new workplace technologies, chastising, “[t]he-times-they-are-a-
changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty”). 
 2. That such technologies are pervasive is indubitable. Nevertheless, a 
multitude of statistics are available to support this assertion. For example, a 
leading consumer research firm, The Nielsen Company, recently reported that 
thirty-seven percent of all mobile customers in the United States have 
smartphones (Blackberry, iPhone, etc.). Android Leads in U.S. Smartphone 
Market Share and Data Usage, NIELSEN (May 31, 2011), http://
blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/android-leads-u-s-in-smartphone-
market-share-and-data-usage.html. Facebook reports that it has over 900 
million users, over 700 million of whom are daily active users. See FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); 
cf. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 654 (N.J. 2010) (“In the 
past twenty years, businesses and private citizens alike have embraced the 
use of computers, electronic communication devices, the Internet, and e-
mail.”). 
 3. See Alison Diana, Workplace Social Network, Personal Device Use 
Gaining, INFORMATIONWEEK (June 24, 2010, 11:54 AM), 
www.informationweek.com/news/windows/microsoft_news/225701319 
(discussing pervasive, and growing, use of social networking sites and 
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and a curse. On one hand, employers reap a multitude of 
benefits from employee use of technologies, including increased 
productivity, efficiency, connectivity, and even morale, among 
others.4 On the other hand, with workers instantly connected to 
the outside world, employers risk disclosure of trade secrets 
and confidential information.5 Employee online activities offer 
a new frontier for workplace harassment, exposing employers 
to liability in ways that are difficult to monitor and control.6 
The lines separating an employee’s work from her life outside 
the office are becoming ever more blurry, as she forges virtual 
                                                          
personal devices at work, and hypothesizing eventual demise of workplace 
bans on such activity); Yammering Away at the Office: A Distraction or a 
Bonus?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2010), www.economist.com/node/15350928 
(stating that with the advent of cloud computing and offerings from firms like 
Apple, Facebook, and Google, consumers now have widespread access to 
communications devices and web applications that they can use from the 
workplace); see also Stengart, 990 A.2d at 655 (“In the modern workplace, for 
example, occasional, personal use of the Internet is commonplace. Yet that 
simple act can raise complex issues about an employer’s monitoring of the 
workplace and an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 4. Cf. IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW § 58.09[2] (Supp. 
2013–14) (“Any policy should be drafted to be consistent with a company’s 
corporate culture. Policies also should be written with an eye towards their 
intended effect on employee morale.”); Ariel D. Cudkowicz et. al., Technology 
and Privacy in the Workplace: Monitoring Employee Communications After the 
Supreme Court’s Quon Decision, BOS. B.J., Fall 2010, at 29, 29 (“[E]mployees 
are regularly encouraged or required to perform their job duties using 
employer-provided technologies, such as computers, PDAs, and e-mail, and 
employers often explicitly permit or tolerate limited use of workplace 
resources to access personal e-mail accounts, commercial websites, and social 
networking sites.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Sasqua Grp., Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10-528(ADS)(AKT), 
2010 WL 3613855 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010) (discussing use by former employee 
of information available on LinkedIn, Facebook, and Bloomberg to compile 
customer information comparable to former employer customer database, and 
concluding that ready availability of such information defeated trade secret 
claim); Complaint at 10, TEKSystems, Inc. v. Hammermick, 2010 WL 1624258 
(D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2010) (No. 0:10-CV-00819) (alleging that former employees 
contacted former employer’s customers via LinkedIn in violation of non-
solicitation covenant in employment contract). 
 6. Cf. Yancy v. U.S. Airways, Inc., No. 10-983, 2011 WL 2945758, at *1 
(E.D. La. July 20, 2011) (granting summary judgment in employee’s sexual 
harassment suit based on Facebook posts by colleagues); Delfino v. Agilent 
Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (resolving negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought by victim of 
threatening e-mails and web bulletin board postings against employer after 
perpetrator used workplace computers); Tresa Baldas, ‘Textual Harassment’ 
on the Rise; Text Messages Can Prove to Be Potent Evidence in Bias Suits, 30 
NAT’L L.J., no. 46, 2009, at 1, 1 (discussing a $450,000 settlement paid by 
university after women’s athletic coach harassed female players with text 
messages). 
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connections with coworkers, supervisors, customers, and 
vendors through social network sites like Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and Pinterest, and she uses her employer-issued 
laptop or smartphone to access her social networks, to check 
her personal web-based e-mail, or to exchange personal text 
messages, among other things.7 
The rapid evolution of workplace technologies raises a 
myriad of novel legal questions, and the law simply has not 
kept pace in providing answers.8 Gone are the days when 
employer monitoring could be accomplished only by observing 
an employee’s conduct at work, listening to her telephone 
conversations from across the room, or conducting a physical 
search of her desk or office.9 Modern technologies permit 
employers to access not only any e-mail messages an employee 
sends or receives using her employer-provided account, but also 
any websites she visits while on the employer’s network or 
equipment, including personal web-based e-mail accounts.10 
Further, with over 900 million people on Facebook,11 chances 
are good that an employer can access a multitude of 
information there or on other social network sites, whether 
related to the company’s business or the employee’s work, or 
not.12 Such a wealth of available information breeds ambiguity 
                                                          
 7. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 654–55 (“In the past twenty years, 
businesses and private citizens alike have embraced the use of computers, 
electronic communication devices, the Internet, and e-mail. As those and other 
forms of technology evolve, the line separating business from personal 
activities can easily blur.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 
2002) (describing federal statutes addressing privacy rights in electronic and 
online information as “a complex, often convoluted, area of the law,” noting 
that the statutes were enacted “prior to the advent of the Internet and the 
World Wide Web,” and concluding that “the existing statutory framework is 
ill-suited to address modern forms of communication”). 
 9. Cf. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712–14 (1987) (assessing an 
employer search of employee’s desk and office in light of privacy concerns 
implicated by the Fourth Amendment); K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 
632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (evaluating invasion of privacy claim based on 
employer search of employee’s workplace locker). 
 10. See Laura Petrecca, More Employers Use Tech to Track Workers, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2010, 12:51 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
workplace/2010-03-17-workplaceprivacy15_CV_N.htm (“Managers use 
technological advances to capture workers’ computer keystrokes, monitor the 
websites they frequent, even track their whereabouts through GPS-enabled 
cellphones.”). 
 11. FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, supra note 2. 
 12. Cf. Petrecca, supra note 10 (“Smarsh, one of many firms that offers 
technology to monitor, archive and search employee communications on         
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concerning the bounds of permissible employer access to, and 
use of, such information, and beckons for legal answers. 
The law is far from silent on the topic of workplace privacy. 
The privacy rights of workers underlie lawsuits in the state 
and federal courts with increasing frequency,13 while state 
legislatures grapple with striking an appropriate balance 
between employer prerogative and employee rights,14 and the 
federal government considers various approaches it might 
take.15 In addition, the debate surrounding workplace privacy 
                                                          
e-mail, IM, Twitter and text-messaging, services about 10,000 U.S. 
workplaces.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps.-IAM v. Vilsack, 681 F.3d 483, 499 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down policy of random drug testing of Forest Service 
Job Corps Center employees on grounds employer’s stated need for such 
testing did not outweigh employees’ privacy interests); Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 
660 F.3d 169, 175–78 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that female deputy sheriff’s 
constitutional invasion of privacy claims were viable under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on video surveillance of flea 
decontamination process, during which she was partially nude); Coughlin v. 
Town of Arlington, No. 10-10203-MLW, 2011 WL 6370932, at *1–2 (D. Mass. 
Dec. 19, 2011) (finding some privacy rights sufficient to support claims of 
school teacher and principal against school district and certain of its 
employees who accessed plaintiffs’ work and personal e-mail accounts and 
disseminated messages therefrom in connection with investigation of alleged 
improper sexual relationship); Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Iowa 
2011) (adopting expansive view of tort of invasion of privacy under which 
plaintiffs’ claims of video surveillance in workplace bathroom survived 
summary judgment even though camera was inoperable at time of its 
discovery, because employer’s electronic device “could have invaded privacy in 
some way”). 
 14. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204.5 (2008) (providing for notice by 
public employers of employee electronic monitoring); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-48d (West 2011) (mandating that employers provide prior written notice 
of electronic monitoring by employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2005) 
(requiring employer notice to employees of electronic monitoring); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 10-7-512 (2012) (requiring same); Kathy Lundy Springuel, Maryland Is 
First State to Restrict Employer Demands for Employee, Applicant Passwords, 
Human Resources Rep. (BNA), at A-12 (May 7, 2012) (identifying Maryland as 
first state to pass legislation restricting employer requests for employee and 
applicable social network passwords and noting that several other states have 
similar legislation pending). 
 15. E.g., Computer Matching and Privacy Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) 
(2012) (specifying when disclosure of employee records may be allowed by 
employers); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) 
(discussing the protection, obligations, disclosure, and enforcement of not-
public personal information); USA PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) 
(discussing fraudulent and unauthorized access in connection with 
computers); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2012) (discussing the different prohibited ramifications of intercepting and 
disclosing wire, oral, or electronic communications); Stored Communications 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012) (discussing unlawful access to stored 
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issues has garnered the attention of numerous legal scholars 
who have published a plethora of books and articles exposing 
the topic.16 Yet amidst all this banter, no clear consensus has 
emerged. Or, if there is a consensus, it is one of ambiguity. 
Out of the abyss of uncertainty, however, a trend may be 
emerging. Early workplace technology cases were few and far 
between and evinced trepidation at confronting the novel 
issues.17 This apparent trepidation seemed to manifest itself in 
reluctance to expand the privacy rights of workers, so that the 
cases nearly always resolved in the employer’s favor.18 But the 
                                                          
communications and the penalties associated therewith); E-Government Act of 
2002, 44 U.S.C. § 36 (2006) (discussing the management and promotion of 
electronic government services); Wireless Communication and Public Safety 
Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006) (discussing telecommunications carriers’ 
duty to protect the confidentiality of customers); PATRIOT Sunsets Extension 
Act of 2011, S. 1038, 112th Cong. (2011) (discussing intelligence and terrorism 
justifications for searching records). 
 16. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (3d 
ed. 2009) (analyzing privacy in the employment relationship and discussing 
relevant statutes and regulations); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, 
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our 
Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011) (describing harms posed by 
digital hate and proposing solutions); Althaf Marsoof, Online Social 
Networking and the Right to Privacy: The Conflicting Rights of Privacy and 
Expression, 19 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 110 (2011) (discussing developments 
in social networking and suggesting approaches to privacy-specific legislation); 
Christopher E. Parker, The Rising Tide of Social Media, FED. LAW., May 2011, 
at 14 (discussing implications of social media use in the workplace); Marie-
Andrée Weiss, The Use of Social Media Sites Data by Business Organizations 
in Their Relationship with Employees, J. INTERNET L., Aug. 2011, at 16 
(examining the pitfalls of using social media sites in decisions relating to 
hiring, maintaining, and terminating employment). 
 17. Cf. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 886 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming summary judgment for employer because employer did not 
“intercept” employee’s communications within meaning of Wiretap Act simply 
by accessing employee’s secure bulletin board). 
 18. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114–15 (3d Cir. 
2003) (concluding that employer accessing employee e-mail stored on 
company’s central file servers without permission did not violate Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act because employer owned the servers); Garrity v. 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, 
at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (holding that employees had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in work e-mail and that employer had legitimate 
business interest in guarding the workplace against offensive 
communications); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(dismissing employee’s claim on grounds employee could not establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy nor highly offensive invasion based on 
employer’s interception of e-mail messages sent from employee’s home 
computer through company e-mail system, notwithstanding employer’s 
assurances that e-mail would not be intercepted); see also infra Part II 
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tide may be turning. Though some courts remain wary of 
entering the fray today, others are now tackling the issues 
head on, and a relative flurry of recent activity may suggest a 
trend in the opposite direction.19 This Article delves deeply into 
this recent flurry and juxtaposes it against early workplace 
technology law to expose the shifting trend. Further, it does so 
in novel ways. While many scholars have opined about the 
rights of workers and the needs of employers in light of 
emerging technologies,20 this is the first scholarly work to 
                                                          
(discussing early technology cases and consensus in favor of employer 
prerogative over employee privacy). In 2001, one commentator starkly exposed 
this phenomenon by offering that “the employee’s right of privacy is a hollow 
shell against the lead weight of the employer’s claim to run his business as he 
pleases.” Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in 
American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453, 475 (2001). 
 19. Cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756–60 (2010) (upholding 
public employer’s search of text messages sent from and received on 
employee’s employer-issued paging device, assuming without deciding that 
employee had reasonable expectation of privacy but concluding that 
employer’s search was reasonable); Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06 C 
4215, 2009 WL 2605283, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009) (denying employer’s 
motion to dismiss intrusion upon seclusion claim brought after employer 
searched plaintiff-employee’s work e-mail account because the defense based 
on allegation of provider exemption under Stored Communications Act did not 
apply given that third party, rather than employer, provided e-mail service); 
Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 
556, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding unlawful employer’s search of employee e-
mail account even though accessed on employer’s equipment because account 
was maintained by third-party provider rather than employer and employee 
therefore established reasonable expectation of privacy in such account); see 
also infra Part II.A (discussing recent technology cases reflective of a trend 
toward employee privacy rights). 
 20. See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-
First Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 325–
28 (2011) (proposing a notice requirement and substantive restrictions in 
workplace monitoring policies); Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, 
Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in 
Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979 (2011) 
(comparing worker privacy in Europe and the United States); Ariana R. 
Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act, 43 AKRON L. 
REV. 331, 340–90 (2010) [hereinafter Levinson, Carpe Diem] (proposing 
legislation to protect employee privacy rights); Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial 
Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
609, 620–21 (2009) [hereinafter Levinson, Industrial Justice] (positing that no 
systematic statutory scheme currently guides common law development of 
employee privacy rights); Lindsay Noyce, Private Ordering of Employee 
Privacy: Protecting Employees’ Expectations of Privacy with Implied-in-Fact 
Contract Rights, 1 AM. U. J. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 27 (2011) (discussing evolution 
of employee privacy rights in light of changing technology and advocating for 
protection of employee privacy under implied-in-fact contract theory); Robert 
Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United 
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conduct a comprehensive analysis of ultra-recent developments 
in the technology-based privacy rights of workers, and the only 
to suggest a trend toward employee rights emerging from 
them.21 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I surveys what 
are termed here the “early” workplace technology privacy laws, 
examining initial forays into the field by courts and legislatures 
surrounding the turn of the new millennium, and attempting to 
extract from those laws a theme favoring employer prerogative, 
rooted in apprehension.22 Part II then fast forwards a decade or 
more, examining more recent developments in workplace 
technology laws, which stand in stark contrast to the reluctant 
entries of the preceding era.23 Including discussion of case law, 
statutes, administrative decisions, and position statements, 
this Part offers a comprehensive look at modern-era regulation 
of technology-based privacy concerns in the workplace, 
revealing a shifting paradigm away from employer prerogative 
                                                          
States and Its De-evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
83 (2008) (arguing that employee privacy rights are diminishing and that 
employer access to personal employee information is extending beyond 
workplace into employee homes). 
 21. Much of the scholarly literature addressing workplace privacy in 
modern technologies tackles the myriad implications for discovery, assuming 
the eventual advent of litigation. See, e.g., Louise L. Hill, Gone But Not 
Forgotten: When Privacy, Policy and Privilege Collide, 9 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 565 (2011) (examining employee privacy expectations as 
relevant to application of attorney-client privilege when communications are 
made over employer network or equipment). Other scholars lament the 
absence or insufficiency of the current law to afford adequate protection to 
employees. Levinson, Carpe Diem, supra note 20, at 331 (“Scholars generally 
agree that the law in the United States fails to adequately protect employees 
from technological monitoring.”); Levinson, Industrial Justice, supra note 20, 
at 620–21 (lamenting the absence of statutory protection for employee privacy 
in workplace technologies); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model 
Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357 (2006) (“Currently, 
the privacy protections in the United States are riddled with gaps and weak 
spots.”). Still others suggest, quite contrary to this Article, that employee 
privacy rights are actually diminishing. Sprague, supra note 20, at 89 
(positing that “the current right to privacy in the United States [is] contextual, 
fluid, and easily subject to elimination”). A few recognize the pro-employee 
trend that this Article posits, but take a different approach. See, e.g., Michael 
Z. Green, Against Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 S.C. L. REV. 323, 348–62 
(2012) (suggesting that employee privacy rights in workplace technologies may 
be expanding, but focusing on cases and other legal developments specific to 
application of attorney-client privilege). As such, this is the first scholarly 
work to both take a comprehensive comparative approach and suggest a trend 
toward employee rights. 
 22. See infra Part I. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
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in favor of employee rights. Part III then juxtaposes the early 
laws of Part I against the recent developments of Part II, 
offering explication of the apparent evolution, proposing 
lessons to be gleaned from the development of the law, and 
hypothesizing about potential next steps.24 
I. EARLY FORAYS INTO WORKPLACE PRIVACY IN LIGHT 
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
The pioneer plaintiffs in workplace privacy cases involving 
emerging technologies like e-mail and the Internet faced an 
uphill battle, attempting to establish new rights in unfamiliar 
territory. In an effort to give the appearance of credibility to 
their otherwise novel claims, many of these trailblazing 
plaintiffs pirated the causes of action commonly relied upon by 
aggrieved employees and manipulated them to suit the 
evolving circumstances. The absence of directly applicable 
laws—whether judge-made or the product of state or federal 
legislative reform—necessitates such an approach. Common-
law tort claims such as invasion of privacy and intrusion upon 
seclusion, as well as the tried-though-rarely-true wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy, were therefore prime 
suspects for the escapades of some early litigants. Others, 
meanwhile, attempted to fashion viable claims out of statutes 
addressed more directly to privacy in technology but not 
necessarily adequate for the employment setting. Notably, and 
as explained more fully below, in none of these cases were the 
pioneering plaintiffs particularly successful. 
A. THE EARLY COMMON-LAW CASES 
1. A Firm Foundation of Disdain for Privacy Rights 
The earliest forays into the domain of employee privacy 
rights in emerging technologies date back to the early 1990s,25 
when e-mail itself was in its relative infancy.26 Perhaps 
                                                          
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See John D. Blackburn et al., Invasion of Privacy: Refocusing the Tort 
in Private Sector Employment, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 41, 42 (1993) (“Advanced 
technology in sophisticated information systems . . . contribute[s] to a 
continuing concern about privacy in the workplace.”). 
 26. See The 41-Year History of Email, MASHABLE (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://mashable.com/2012/09/20/evolution-email/ (discussing how internet 
service providers allowed widespread access to the internet in 1991, but there 
were still limited options). 
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reflective of the trepidation with which the courts entered the 
fray, one of the earliest decisions addressing employee privacy 
claims related to technological monitoring, Bourke v. Nissan 
Motor Corp., was never published and thus is not widely 
available.27 In that case, the court’s swift rejection of the 
plaintiffs’ claims starkly illustrates the court’s distaste for the 
suggestion that such privacy rights should exist.28 The 
plaintiffs, Bonita Bourke and Rhonda Hall, worked for Nissan 
Motor Corp. as Information Systems Specialists tasked 
primarily with troubleshooting for personnel who used the 
central computer system at Infiniti dealerships.29 After random 
discovery of an e-mail message sent by Bourke to a dealership 
employee, which was of a personal, sexual nature, Nissan 
conducted a further review of Bourke’s e-mail and found 
“substantial numbers of personal, including sexual, messages 
from Bourke” as well as her co-plaintiff Hall.30 The subject e-
mail messages violated Nissan’s policy prohibiting personal use 
of the company computer system, so Nissan issued disciplinary 
warnings to both Bourke and Hall as a result of its discovery.31 
Subsequently, both plaintiffs received poor performance 
reviews.32 Nissan then issued Bourke a final disciplinary 
warning when her performance continued to suffer, but she 
resigned the day after receiving it.33 The company terminated 
Hall’s employment the same day.34 
Shortly after leaving Nissan, Bourke and Hall joined as 
plaintiffs in a suit against the company, claiming that Nissan’s 
review of their e-mail accounts constituted a common-law 
invasion of privacy, violated their constitutional right to 
privacy as well as criminal wiretapping and eavesdropping 
statutes, and gave rise to a claim for wrongful discharge in 
                                                          
 27. See Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July 
26, 1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_v_Nissan.html. 
The decision does not appear in either of the primary legal databases, 
Westlaw or LexisNexis, but it has a dedicated page on Wikipedia. See Bourke 
v. Nissan Motor Co., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bourke_v._
Nissan_Motor_Co. (last updated Nov. 8, 2013). 
 28. Cf. Bourke, No. B068705. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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violation of public policy.35 The trial court granted Nissan’s 
motion for summary judgment, refusing to recognize any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace e-mail, and 
plaintiffs appealed.36 The plaintiffs fared no better at the 
appellate level, though.37 Addressing first the plaintiffs’ claims 
that Nissan violated privacy rights protected by both the 
common law and the Constitution, the court gave short shrift to 
the plaintiffs’ allegations, finding that the company’s computer 
policy permitting only business use, coupled with the plaintiffs’ 
knowledge that Nissan employees other than the intended 
recipient could review e-mail messages, negated any objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in them.38 In the absence of 
any such reasonable expectation, their privacy claims failed.39 
The plaintiffs’ remaining claims fared no better.40 Both of 
the statutory causes of action failed on the grounds that 
neither statute invoked by the plaintiffs addressed interception 
of e-mail.41 Instead, both were addressed to communication 
modes like telegraphs and telephone wires that existed at a 
time when no one even contemplated the eventual invention 
now known as electronic mail.42 And, the plaintiffs’ claims of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy likewise failed 
to pass muster, as the absence of a constitutional right to 
privacy in the e-mail, announced earlier in the court’s opinion, 
obviated its demise—without a public policy violation, no 
wrongful discharge could have occurred.43 Thus, in this very 
early clash between employee privacy rights and workplace 
technologies, the prerogative of the employer to control its 
workplace easily prevailed. 
Another three years would pass after the decision in 
Bourke before the case that became widely known as the first 
published opinion addressing employee privacy rights in e-mail 
would appear.44 That case was Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., rendered 
                                                          
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (discussing California Penal Code sections 631 and 632). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Cf. Charles J. Muhl, Workplace E-mail and Internet Use: Employees 
and Employers Beware, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2003, at 36, 37 (“Employees 
often mistakenly believe that their use of the Internet and e-mail at the 
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in 1996, and, like Bourke, it also followed the common-law 
route.45 Plaintiff-employee Smyth, relying upon his employer’s 
repeated assurances that all e-mail communications would 
remain confidential and could not supply grounds for 
termination, exchanged several e-mail messages with his 
supervisor that the company contends derided management.46 
Notwithstanding its clear policy to the contrary, Pillsbury 
terminated Smyth’s employment on the basis of the 
“inappropriate and unprofessional comments” made in the e-
mail messages.47 Smyth then brought a diversity lawsuit in 
Pennsylvania federal court seeking relief under the traditional 
employment tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy.48 Without even filing an answer, Pillsbury responded 
with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).49 
The court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss only 
four months after the complaint was filed and without any 
other proceedings taking place.50 Its discussion of the law 
began with a caution-ridden exposition of the tort’s narrow 
scope.51 In Pennsylvania, as in many or indeed most of the 
forty-nine states in which the at-will doctrine persists,52 
erosions of the employer’s ability to discharge an employee for 
any reason remain narrow.53 The court explained that 
                                                          
workplace is private when, in fact, courts have found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in such use and have consistently permitted employers 
to monitor and review activity. The seminal case in this area is Smyth v. The 
Pillsbury Company . . . .”). 
 45. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). As 
evidence of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s role as seminal, the court in 
Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. referenced “a dearth of 
case law on privacy issues with regard to office email,” then cited Smyth as 
“instructive.” Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002). 
 46. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98–99. 
 47. Id. at 98. 
 48. Id. at 99. 
 49. Id. at 98; Docket, Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (No. 95-CV-05712). 
 50. Docket, supra note 49. 
 51. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 99. 
 52. See generally Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. 
L. REV. 951, 986 n.159 (2011) (“The at-will rule is that an employee may be 
fired for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all . . . . The at-will rule is 
the law in forty-nine states with Montana the sole exception.”). 
 53. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 99 (“Pennsylvania is an employment at-
will jurisdiction and an employer may discharge an employee with or without 
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Pennsylvania law recognizes exceptions to the at-will doctrine 
only “in the most limited of circumstances, . . . where discharge 
of an at-will employee threatens or violates a clear mandate of 
public policy,” cautioning that the “exception is an especially 
narrow one.”54 Specifically, Pennsylvania courts had recognized 
the tort in only three limited circumstances: when an employee 
is discharged for serving on jury duty, when an employer 
refuses hire based on a prior conviction, and when an employee 
is fired for proper reporting of federal-regulation violations.55 
In each circumstance, the court that rendered the decision 
relied directly and heavily upon a clearly defined and firmly 
established public policy, embodied in legislation, judicial 
decisions, or administrative rules or regulations.56 Thus, the 
                                                          
cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by some contract.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. In the case of jury duty, the rendering court cited the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and state statutes referencing “the necessity of having citizens 
freely available for jury service.” Id. (quoting Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 
Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)). As to use of prior convictions in 
hiring, the court that issued the decision cited the state constitution and 
judicial decisions reflecting “‘the deeply ingrained public policy of this 
State . . . to avoid unwarranted stigmatization of and unreasonable 
restrictions upon former offenders.’” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Port Auth. of 
Allegheny Cnty., 419 A.2d 631, 636 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)). Finally, as to 
reporting violations of federal regulations, the rendering court relied upon 
policies typically supporting whistleblower protections, including that the 
pertinent law required the employee to report the violations, that the 
employee possessed relevant knowledge and expertise to inform his report, 
and that the employee did not bypass any internal reporting procedures. Id. 
(citing Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)). 
“Whistleblower” is the term commonly used to refer to an employee who 
reports unlawful activity by his employer. See Whistleblower Definition, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistleblowing (last visited Feb. 7, 
2014) (“A whistleblower (whistle-blower or whistle blower) is a person who 
exposes misconduct, alleged dishonest or illegal activity occurring in an 
organization.” (footnote omitted)). Whistleblower protection laws have 
flourished in recent years, particularly in the wake of the Enron and 
Worldcom debacles which were brought to light by corporate whistleblowers. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (providing civil private right of action and 
remedy for whistleblowers who report violations of various securities laws, 
among other things); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 1558, 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 218C (2012)) 
(providing broad protection from retaliation for employees who report 
violations of the Act’s provisions); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297 (2009) (prohibiting any 
private employer or state or local government entity receiving funds under the 
Act from retaliating against employees who disclose information concerning 
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court made plain that the applicable law recognizes a viable 
claim only when the public policy allegedly violated by the 
employee’s discharge is clearly defined in a firmly established 
law.57 
Because Smyth’s claim fit into none of the pigeonholes 
established under Pennsylvania law—his claim had nothing to 
do with jury duty, a prior conviction, or whistleblowing58—he 
faced a substantial uphill battle. Attempting to convince the 
court to drill a new pigeonhole, Smyth contended that his 
discharge violated the state’s public policy favoring an 
employee’s right to privacy, as reflected in common law.59 He 
relied upon a decision from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc.,60 in 
which the plaintiff-employee claimed wrongful discharge upon 
her refusal to submit to a urinalysis and a search of her 
personal property at work.61 Borse, like Smyth, was also in 
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.62 The Borse 
court therefore searched Pennsylvania law for instruction on 
whether the courts of that state would recognize a claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy on the basis of 
an invasion of privacy.63 Finding no binding state law on point, 
the Third Circuit engaged in an “Erie guess”—an informed 
                                                          
improper use of stimulus funds); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, § 219, 122 Stat. 3016, 3062 (prohibiting 
retaliation against employees who provide information about violations of the 
Act to his or her employer, to the federal government, or to the attorney 
general of any state); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 
116 Stat. 745, 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)) (making unlawful 
retaliation by publicly held companies against whistleblower employees who 
make certain covered disclosures). 
 57. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101 (“[D]efendant’s actions did not 
tortiously invade the plaintiff’s privacy and, therefore, did not violate public 
policy.”). 
 58. See id. at 100. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 61. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100. 
 62. See id. (discussing the Third Circuit’s application of Pennsylvania law, 
which occurs only in diversity cases); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) 
(providing for jurisdiction in federal courts over state-law claims on the basis 
of diversity of citizenship); Borse, 963 F.2d at 613 (“The district court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 . . . . Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law 
of the state whose laws govern the action.”). 
 63. Borse, 963 F.2d at 621–22. 
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supposition about what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would decide if it were faced with a comparable situation.64 
The court in Borse concluded that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court might recognize a claim of wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy based on invasion of privacy, but 
only if the alleged invasion was “substantial and highly 
offensive.”65 Further, the court projected that in determining 
whether an alleged invasion of privacy is substantial and 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, “Pennsylvania would 
adopt a balancing test which balances the employee’s privacy 
interest against the employer’s interest in maintaining a drug-
free workplace.”66 Having announced those principles of law, 
though, the Borse court then remanded, with instructions that 
the district court grant the plaintiff leave to amend so that she 
might allege specifically how her employer’s actions violated 
her right to privacy.67 Thus, while the Borse decision offered 
Smyth some grounds upon which to rest his contention that his 
claim was viable, it lacked any specific instruction as to how 
the court’s hypothesized standard might apply.68 
The Smyth court did not question the reliability of the 
Borse court’s crafted rules, or, more generally, that the law of 
Pennsylvania would recognize the tort of wrongful discharge 
based on violation of the public policy favoring employee 
privacy.69 Nevertheless, the court concluded that Smyth failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.70 The 
central fallacy in Smyth’s claim, according to the court, was a 
broad proposition of law that wields especially significant 
                                                          
 64. Id. at 625 (“[W]e predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
apply a balancing test to determine whether the Shop’s drug and alcohol 
program . . . invaded Borse’s privacy.”). The term “Erie guess” refers to the 
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which 
held that state substantive law applies in federal courts sitting in diversity. 
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). When there is no state law 
on point, the federal court is forced to guess how the highest court of that state 
would decide the issue, if it were presented. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. 
v. Ernst & Young LLP, 542 F.3d 475, 482–83 (5th Cir. 2008) (“When state law 
provides no definitive answers to the question presented, we must make an 
educated ‘Erie guess’ as to how the [state] Supreme Court would resolve the 
issue.”). 
 65. Borse, 963 F.2d at 621. 
 66. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100 (citing Borse, 963 F.2d at 625). 
 67. Id. (citing Borse, 963 F.2d at 626). 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 101. 
 70. Id. at 100–01. 
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weight here—that an employee lacks “a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an 
employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system.”71 
Perhaps even more importantly, the court boldly declared this 
so, “notwithstanding any assurances that such communications 
would not be intercepted by management.”72 Then, further 
entrenching its cool reception to any suggestion of privacy in e-
mail, the court distinguished the e-mail context of Smyth’s case 
from the urinalysis exam at issue in Borse: “Significantly, the 
defendant did not require plaintiff, as in the case of an 
urinalysis or personal property search[,] to disclose any 
personal information about himself. Rather, plaintiff 
voluntarily communicated the alleged unprofessional 
comments over the company e-mail system. We find no privacy 
interests in such communications.”73 Thus, the court, seemingly 
without the least hesitation, declared quite unequivocally that 
employees should expect no privacy in workplace e-mail 
communications. 
The court’s stark scorn for any claimed privacy in 
workplace electronic communications did not end there, 
however. The court went on to declare that even if a reasonable 
expectation of privacy could be found (and although here it 
could not), a reasonable person could not consider the 
interception of Smyth’s e-mail communications “to be a 
substantial and highly offensive invasion of . . . privacy.”74 
Again the court relied upon the distinction it perceived between 
urinalysis and physical searches of personal property, on one 
hand, and review of e-mail communications, on the other.75 The 
court justified its conclusion in light of the policy favoring 
employer control: “Moreover, the company’s interest in 
preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even 
illegal activity over its e-mail system outweighs any privacy 
interest the employee may have in those comments.”76 Thus, 
the court unwaveringly declined to recognize any employee 
privacy interest in e-mail communications sent on the company 
                                                          
 71. Id. at 101. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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system, notwithstanding a published policy statement to the 
contrary.77 Employer prerogative reigned supreme. 
The palpable malevolence for employee privacy expressed 
by the Smyth court is remarkable, but the impact of its holding 
is confounded by the procedural posture. The court decided the 
case on a motion to dismiss filed even before an answer to the 
complaint.78 The essence of such motions is that the plaintiff’s 
complaint fails to state an actionable claim so that, under the 
standard that governed at the time, the motion could be 
granted only if the court concluded that plaintiff could prove 
“no set of facts” that would support his claim for relief.79 The 
standard was quite forgiving, and resulted in dismissal only 
when the complaint revealed that the claims were indubitably 
defective, regardless of any then-unknown facts a plaintiff 
might conceivably muster in support.80 The precedential effect 
                                                          
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 98; Docket, Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (No. 95-CV-05712). 
 79. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). As any litigator, 
proceduralist, or even first-year law student undoubtedly knows, the United 
States Supreme Court in recent years rendered two seminal decisions 
addressing the standard governing such motions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). While some debate lingers among the courts 
and commentators as to whether, and if so, to what extent, Twombly and Iqbal 
altered the standard under Rule 12(b)(6), it is generally accepted that the 
Court “retired” the Conley “no set of facts” standard in favor of a “plausibility” 
standard and that, at a minimum, it is possible for a court to interpret and 
apply that plausibility standard in such a way that might lead to dismissal of 
some cases that would have survived under Conley. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 
(describing Twombly’s effect as retirement of Conley’s pleading standard); 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (stating that Conley’s “no set of facts” standard “has 
earned its retirement”); JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf 
(reviewing empirical data concerning motions to dismiss filed before and after 
Twombly and Iqbal, and concluding that no statistically significant change 
occurred in how motions were resolved before those decisions as compared to 
after). 
 80. E.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double 
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 6, 18 n.60 (2010) 
(explaining development of pleadings law and indicating that dismissal 
became more likely under Twombly and Iqbal than it had been under Conley); 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434–35 
(2008) (describing the pleading regime under Conley as “simplified” and as 
more permissive to plaintiffs than under the modernized standard); Michael 
C. Dorf, Should Congress Change the Standard for Dismissing a Federal 
Lawsuit?, FINDLAW (July 29, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20090729.html (“Twombly and Iqbal make it harder for plaintiffs who might 
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of such decisions was significant because the holding indicated 
not just that the plaintiff in that particular case could not 
muster sufficient proof of his claims, but rather could be read 
more broadly to stand for the proposition that the law would 
not recognize a claim in any such comparable case. The import 
of Smyth as the trailblazing opinion addressing privacy in 
workplace technologies81 was therefore salient: a plaintiff lacks 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace e-mail 
communications, even if the employer expressly guarantees 
otherwise, and the employer’s enforcement of its rights to 
monitor employee e-mail cannot support a claim for relief by an 
aggrieved employee.82 
2. In Smyth’s Wake 
On the heels of Smyth, other courts confronting common-
law claims that arose from monitoring of workplace 
technologies followed the Smyth court’s lead.83 McLaren v. 
Microsoft Corp. is archetypal and mirrors Smyth in myriad 
respects.84 Plaintiff Bill McLaren worked for Microsoft 
Corporation in Texas.85 He worked in an office environment, 
and Microsoft furnished him with a networked computer and e-
mail address.86 When another employee accused McLaren of 
sexual harassment, Microsoft suspended McLaren’s 
employment pending an investigation into the accusations.87 In 
response, McLaren requested access to his e-mail in an effort to 
disprove the allegations, but Microsoft refused general access, 
                                                          
have meritorious cases, but need access to defense witnesses and files, to have 
their cases heard.”). 
 81. Unpublished decisions entered prior to Smyth reached conclusions 
consistent with it. See, e.g., Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 26, 1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_
v_Nissan.html (holding that plaintiff employees had no objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mail messages sent on company computer system 
despite employees’ subjective belief to the contrary due to fact that access was 
limited by password). The Bourke decision is particularly notable because the 
right to privacy of California citizens is firmly rooted in an amendment to that 
state’s constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 82. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100–01. 
 83. See, e.g., Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-
12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); McLaren v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May 28, 
1999). 
 84. See McLaren, 1999 WL 339015. 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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instead requiring that he specify to company officials the 
identity and location of individual messages he wished to see.88 
He never made any such request, and Microsoft terminated his 
employment shortly thereafter.89 
McLaren filed suit in Texas state court claiming an 
invasion of privacy by Microsoft when it accessed e-mail 
messages stored in “personal folders” on his work computer and 
subsequently disclosed the contents of those messages to “third 
parties.”90 McLaren contended that he manifested a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mail messages stored in those 
“personal folders” because Microsoft’s system enabled him to 
create a password to restrict access to those folders, and he 
took advantage of that technology.91 In response, Microsoft 
filed, inter alia, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.92 The trial court granted 
Microsoft’s motion, and McLaren appealed.93 
The analysis of the Texas Court of Appeals in McLaren 
bears striking similarities to that of the federal district court in 
Smyth.94 After finding no merit in McLaren’s preliminary 
procedural objection, the court proceeded to conclude, just as 
the court in Smyth did, that the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy 
claim must fail as a matter of law because he had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail messages, and, 
even if he did, Microsoft’s review of them would not have been 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.95 A key component of 
McLaren’s privacy argument rested upon the password-
                                                          
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Cf. id. (“McLaren allege[d] . . . that [b]y allowing [him] to have a 
personal store password for his personal folders, [McLaren] manifested and 
[Microsoft] recognized an expectation that the personal folders would be free 
from intrusion and interference.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 92. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals referred to Microsoft’s response as a 
“special exception,” but its description of the procedural device indicates that 
it is comparable to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at *2 
(describing a special exception under Texas procedural rules). 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 
97 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
 95. McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *2, *4–5. The court concluded that “a 
reasonable person would not consider Microsoft’s interception of these 
communications to be a highly offensive invasion.” Id. at *5. 
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protection afforded to his e-mail messages by Microsoft.96 The 
e-mail system that Microsoft utilized allowed McLaren to 
restrict access to his personal e-mail folders with a “personal 
store” password created by him.97 This password afforded 
additional protection beyond the network password that 
McLaren used to access the Microsoft network.98 McLaren 
contended that by allowing him to protect his personal folders 
with a password known only by him, Microsoft should have 
known that McLaren expected privacy in messages stored 
there—privacy that Microsoft invaded when it decrypted his 
personal store password and accessed his folders.99 
In support of his contention that the personal store 
password gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
McLaren relied principally on an invasion of privacy case that 
arose in a more traditional setting.100 In K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 
the plaintiff-employee claimed invasion of privacy when K-
Mart searched the locker provided for her use at work.101 The 
Texas Court of Appeals held that, even though the locker was 
the employer’s property and would be subject to legitimate 
searches while unlocked, the “employee manifested, and the 
employer recognized, an expectation that the locker and its 
contents would be free from intrusion and interference” solely 
because, with the employer’s knowledge, the employee provided 
her own lock.102 McLaren argued that the password he created 
to protect the contents of his personal folders was directly 
analogous to the employee-provided lock in Trotti, and should 
likewise dictate a finding that his expectation of privacy was 
reasonable.103 
The court disagreed with McLaren’s suggestion, coolly 
rejecting the opportunity to import traditional privacy 
protections into the modern workplace.104 As a threshold 
matter, the court distinguished Trotti’s locker, provided solely 
for personal use, from McLaren’s e-mail, which was integral to 
                                                          
 96. Id. at *4. 
 97. Id. at *1. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *4. 
 101. 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984). 
 102. Id. at 637. 
 103. See McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4. 
 104. See id. 
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his work.105 Reasoning that “the e-mail messages contained on 
the company computer were not McLaren’s personal property, 
but were merely an inherent part of the office environment,” 
the court rejected McLaren’s argument that “only the 
technology is different.”106 K-Mart provided Trotti’s locker 
solely for storage of her personal belongings, but Microsoft 
provided McLaren’s computer and e-mail to enable him to 
perform his job.107 
In a similar vein, the court also distinguished McLaren’s 
case from Trotti’s on grounds that her locker “was a discrete, 
physical place where the employee, separate and apart from 
other employees, could store her tangible, personal 
belongings.”108 By contrast, even those messages stored in 
McLaren’s personal folders only ended up there after passing 
through the employer’s network where they were fully 
accessible by Microsoft officials.109 The crux of the court’s 
rationale here seemed to be that because Trotti did not use the 
locker for any work-related purpose and stored only personal 
belongings there, its physical separation from the employer’s 
property supported a viable expectation of privacy. McLaren, 
on the other hand, lacked any such reasonable expectation 
because the e-mail system on which he stored his “personal” 
messages also contained work-related messages, albeit in 
different locations.110 The folders containing personal 
messages, according to the court, were not “discrete” in the way 
that Trotti’s locker was, and thus warranted different 
treatment.111 In the end, the employer’s prerogative to monitor 
and search the employee’s use of workplace technologies, 
notwithstanding their “personal” label, prevailed.112 
The turn of the new millennium did not usher in much 
change in the approach courts took toward the privacy rights of 
employees in workplace technologies. The United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, deciding 
                                                          
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (noting that e-mail was provided so employees could perform job-
related functions). 
 111. See id. (noting that the messages were initially transmitted over the 
company network). 
 112. See id. 
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Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., continued 
the trend of rejecting common-law claims begun by the Smyth 
and McLaren courts, citing both as definitive authorities for the 
proposition that an employee has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in e-mail messages transmitted via an employer’s 
network.113 The plaintiffs Nancy Garrity and Joanne Clark 
sued defendant John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 
(“Hancock”) when Hancock terminated their employment after 
discovering that both plaintiff-employees had transmitted 
numerous sexually explicit e-mail messages, many from 
internet joke sites, over the company’s e-mail system.114 
Hancock contended that their conduct violated its e-mail policy, 
which prohibited “sexually oriented” messages and threatened 
disciplinary action for “inappropriate use of E-mail.”115 The 
policy also reserved Hancock’s rights to review e-mail, albeit 
while indicating that such review would not occur with 
regularity: “All information stored, transmitted, received or 
contained in the company’s E-mail systems is the property of 
John Hancock. It is not company policy to intentionally inspect 
E-mail usage. However, there may be business or legal 
situations that necessitate company review of E-mail messages 
and other documents.”116 
After Hancock terminated the plaintiffs’ employment based 
on its perception that the plaintiffs had violated the company e-
mail policy, plaintiffs sued, asserting, among other things, 
claims for invasion of privacy, violation of the Massachusetts 
Wiretap Act,117 and wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy.118 Hancock filed a motion for summary judgment, which 
the court swiftly granted, offering only short explanations for 
the dismissal of each claim.119 First, the court flatly rejected 
the plaintiffs’ contention that the company’s provision of 
password-protected personal e-mail folders gave rise to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mail messages those 
folders contained.120 Citing Smyth as instructive and adopting 
                                                          
 113. Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002). 
 114. Id. at *1. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1998). 
 118. Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *1. 
 119. Id. at *1–4. 
 120. Id. at *1–2. 
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wholesale the rationale offered in McLaren, the court reasoned 
that the plaintiffs’ privacy expectations were unreasonable, 
notwithstanding the opportunity to create password-protected 
folders, because all messages contained in those folders had 
first to pass through the employer’s network.121 Further, the 
court went on to state that even if plaintiffs had some 
reasonable privacy expectations, the employer’s “legitimate 
business interest in protecting its employees from harassment 
in the workplace would likely trump [those] privacy 
interests.”122 As such, plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim 
failed.123 
The Garrity plaintiffs were no more successful on their 
remaining claims.124 First, as to their statutory claim under the 
Massachusetts Wiretap Act, the court concluded, with little 
explanation, that the communications at issue fell outside the 
scope of the statute’s protection because “the reading of e-mails, 
after they have been transmitted to the recipient, does not 
constitute ‘interception’ within the wiretap statute.”125 The 
statute, which was originally enacted in an effort to redress 
wiretapping and eavesdropping in organized crime, pre-dated 
the inception and spread of e-mail by several decades.126 As 
such, the statute is ill-equipped to address modern needs. 
Moreover, Massachusetts courts had already, prior to the 
decision in Garrity, interpreted the statute in such a way as to 
exclude e-mail messages stored in application or network 
folders because the reading of stored messages does not 
constitute “interception,”127—the act that the statute 
                                                          
 121. Id. at *2 (citing McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 
1999 WL 339015, at *4 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at *3–4. 
 125. Id. at *3 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1998)). 
 126. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A) (“The general court finds that 
organized crime exists within the commonwealth and that the increasing 
activities of organized crime constitute a grave danger to the public welfare 
and safety.”). 
 127. Id. (defining interception as “to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid 
another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral 
communication through the use of any intercepting device”); see Mark E. 
Schreiber, Employer E-mail and Internet Risks, Policy Guidelines and 
Investigations, 85 MASS. L. REV. 74, 86 (2000) (“One can expect further 
interpretations of this state’s wiretap statute to exclude from liability 
employer e-mail or Internet monitoring efforts, provided such systems have a 
demonstrable business purpose.”). 
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prohibits.128 Second, their wrongful discharge tort claim 
likewise failed, on grounds that it was duplicative of the 
invasion-of-privacy and statutory claims and thus effectively 
fell to preemption.129 And, finding no greater success on their 
remaining claims—one under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) and one for defamation, neither of which 
is especially relevant here—the plaintiffs’ case was dismissed 
in its entirety.130 Thus, the Garrity plaintiffs, like those who 
came before them in Bourke, Smyth, and McLaren, garnered 
little sympathy for their alleged privacy violations, as the court 
in each case swiftly rejected the efforts of every plaintiff to 
carve out even a sliver of asylum in the abyss of cyberspace. 
B. EARLY STATUTORY CLAIMS 
Trailblazing plaintiffs aggrieved by workplace technology 
searches that they perceived as unfair and improper looked not 
only to the common law, but also to state and federal statutes, 
in an effort to find a remedy.131 For the most part, they met no 
warmer reception on their statutory claims than their common-
law ones, though. The statutes, like the common law, pre-dated 
the advent and spread of e-mail and the internet, and were 
therefore ill-suited to redress the wrongs that the plaintiffs 
alleged. Moreover, the judges who were deciding their claims 
faced a new frontier, attempting to apply antiquated legal 
regimes to complex and rapidly evolving technologies, with 
which many of them were mostly or even wholly unfamiliar.132 
The result was near wholesale rejection of the pioneer 
plaintiffs’ efforts to find relief via statute, often as readily and 
swiftly as the courts had rejected their common-law claims.133 
                                                          
 128. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A); Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3 
(indicating that the Massachusetts Wiretap Act should be interpreted in 
accordance with the construction given to the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) by federal courts); Eagle Inv. Sys. Corp. v. Tamm, 
146 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the ECPA prohibits 
only acquisition of electronic communications that occur during transmission). 
 129. Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3. 
 130. Id. at *4 (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
 131. See, e.g., Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3–4; Bourke v. Nissan Motor 
Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 1993), available at 
http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_v_Nissan.html. 
 132. See, e.g., Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3–4; Bourke, No. B068705. 
 133. See, e.g., Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3–4; Bourke, No. B068705. 
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1. Claims Invoking Antiquated State Statutes 
Employee-plaintiffs relied on state statutes in an effort to 
carve out a respite of privacy protection in workplace 
technologies as far back as the early 1990s, when the 
technologies themselves were still in their infancy. Bourke, 
discussed at some length above, is illustrative.134 Plaintiffs 
Bourke and Hall, disgruntled by Nissan’s termination of their 
employment after the discovery of personal and sexual 
messages on their company e-mail, not only brought common-
law and constitutional claims for invasion of privacy, but also 
asserted claims under two state statutes.135 The first statute, 
California Penal Code section 631,136 prohibited: 
“[I]ntentional[] tap[ping], or mak[ing] any unauthorized 
connection . . . with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, 
or instrument, . . . or . . . read[ing], or attempt[ing] to read, or 
learn the contents of any message, report, or communication 
while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line or 
cable . . . .”137 
A separate provision afforded a civil remedy for the kind of 
wiretapping that the statute prohibits, but the court still 
rejected the claim because the statute did not cover “retrieval, 
printing and reading of E-mail messages.”138 Moreover, the 
court reasoned that the statute had no bearing on the case 
because Nissan, as the provider of the network service on 
which the subject e-mail messages were sent, received, and 
stored, did not need to “tap” into anything—the messages were 
readily available to Nissan on the system that it owned and 
operated.139 Nor did Nissan access the messages during any 
transmission, as they were already in storage when Nissan 
reviewed them.140 Thus, even while acknowledging the 
antiquated nature of the law, the court concluded summarily: 
“E-mail messages simply are not included within the actions 
proscribed by Penal Code section 631.”141 
The court adopted similar reasoning in rejecting the second 
statutory provision invoked by the Bourke plaintiffs, California 
                                                          
 134. Bourke, No. B068705; see supra notes 28–43 (discussing Bourke). 
 135. Bourke, No. B068705. 
 136. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 2011). 
 137. Bourke, No. B068705 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 631). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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Penal Code section 632.142 That statute “prohibits the 
eavesdropping or recording of a ‘confidential communication by 
means of any electronic amplifying or recording device.’”143 The 
court found it inapposite just as readily as section 631: “Again, 
the plain words of the statute simpl[y] do not permit a finding 
that Nissan’s conduct violated the law, as no amplifying or 
recording device was used to retrieve and read plaintiffs’ E-
mail messages.”144 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ statutory 
claims wholesale, concluding that the statutes had no bearing 
on an employer’s review of worker e-mail.145 
The court in Garrity, considering a Massachusetts wiretap 
statute strikingly similar to the California provisions invoked 
in Bourke, reached the same result on nearly identical 
reasoning.146 The subject statute, Massachusetts General Laws 
chapter 272, section 99, prohibits interception of wire and oral 
communications.147 Just as did the court in Bourke, the Garrity 
court concluded swiftly that an employer’s review of an 
employee’s stored e-mail communications fell outside the ambit 
of the statute’s protection: “Because the reading of e-mails, 
after they have been transmitted to the recipient, does not 
constitute ‘interception’ within the wiretap statute, plaintiffs’ 
claim fails.”148 Further, the court also indicated that even if the 
kind of e-mail review conducted by the employer amounted to 
“interception” under the statute, it still might not apply 
because the statute’s “ordinary business exemption” could 
protect the automatic back-up system on which the plaintiffs’ 
reviewed e-mails were stored.149 Thus, just as in Bourke, the 
court readily concluded that the state statute invoked by the 
plaintiffs applied only to more arcane forms of wire and oral 
communications and had no bearing on plaintiffs’ gripes about 
Hancock’s review of their e-mail.150 
                                                          
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 632). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *3 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. 
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2. Claims Premised on Evolving Federal Statutes 
The original federal counterparts to the California and 
Massachusetts wiretap statutes at issue in Bourke and Garrity, 
respectively, likewise addressed only older forms of wire and 
oral communications and did not anticipate the changes that 
accompanied the evolution of electronic data and 
communication modes. As such, the original statutes were 
wholly ill-suited to redress the privacy claims of employees 
complaining that employers had improperly reviewed their 
electronic mail or other internet use in the workplace. Congress 
led the way in amending the subject statutes to account for the 
evolving technologies, but even so, the changes themselves are 
now antiquated and are not without their lingering 
shortcomings. 
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States 
Secret Service arose in a non-workplace setting but is 
nevertheless a precedent on which courts confronting 
workplace claims commonly rely for its interpretation of the 
federal statutes addressed to review and interception of wire 
and electronic communications.151 The plaintiffs in Steve 
Jackson Games were the operator, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. 
(SJG), and users (various individuals) of an electronic bulletin 
board on which the users exchanged and stored e-mail 
messages related to SJG’s business, which included role-
playing games and related publications, among other things.152 
The United States Secret Service, in connection with an 
unrelated investigation, confiscated the SJG computer on 
which such e-mail messages were exchanged and stored.153 
Plaintiffs then sued, claiming that when the Secret Service 
                                                          
 151. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“Every circuit court to have considered the matter has held that an ‘intercept’ 
under the ECPA must occur contemporaneously with transmission . . . . The 
first case to do so, Steve Jackson Games, noted that ‘intercept’ was defined as 
contemporaneous in the context of an aural communication under the old 
Wiretap Act . . . .”); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876–77 
(9th Cir. 2002) (“In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 
36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit held that the government’s 
acquisition of email messages stored on an electronic bulletin board system, 
but not yet retrieved by the intended recipients, was not an ‘interception’ 
under the Wiretap Act . . . . We agree with the Steve Jackson [] court[] that the 
narrow definition of ‘intercept’ applies to electronic communications.”); Steve 
Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 152. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458. 
 153. Id. at 459. 
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reviewed and deleted the “private” e-mail messages from the 
SJG computer, it violated the Privacy Protection Act,154 the 
Federal Wiretap Act, as amended by Title I of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),155 and Title II of the 
ECPA.156 
Fruitful discussion of these statutes necessitates, as a 
precursor, some enlightenment on their historical development. 
The statutory scheme, which is at best described as 
“complex”157 and perhaps more appropriately denominated as 
perplexing, includes the Federal Wiretap Act and both Titles I 
and II of the ECPA, the latter of which is commonly referred to 
as the Stored Communications Act (SCA).158 The Federal 
Wiretap Act, out of which the other related laws have 
developed over time, originated as an effort to combat 
wiretapping and eavesdropping of the sort that permeated 
organized crime in the 1960s.159 It was not until more than 
twenty years later that Congress added to the Wiretap Act 
protections for electronic communications as well, via the 
ECPA.160 The ECPA, in turn, separated the protections it 
afforded electronic communications into two categories: (1) 
communications in transit, the “interception” of which was 
                                                          
 154. Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006). The Privacy 
Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for the government, while conducting 
a criminal investigation, “to search for or seize any work product materials 
possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to 
the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public 
communication . . . .” Id. § 2000aa(a). The PPA is not directly relevant to this 
Article; as such, the plaintiffs’ PPA claim in Steve Jackson Games does not 
warrant substantial attention or analysis here. 
 155. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2012). 
 156. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 157. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he intersection of . . . [the Wiretap Act, as amended by the ECPA, and the 
SCA,] is a complex, often convoluted, area of the law.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 158. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications 
Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 
1208 (“The privacy of stored Internet communications in the United States is 
governed by a federal statute known as the Stored Communications Act 
(‘SCA’). The SCA was enacted in 1986 as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.” (footnote omitted)). 
 159. See generally Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the 
Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 12–14 (2004) (discussing origin 
and enactment of Wiretap Act in 1960s). 
 160. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
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proscribed by Title I of the ECPA; and (2) communications in 
“storage,” which were protected by Title II of the ECPA, also 
known as the SCA.161 As explained by the Fifth Circuit: 
Section 2511 was enacted in 1968 as part of Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, often 
referred to as the Federal Wiretap Act. Prior to the 1986 
amendment by Title I of the ECPA, it covered only wire and oral 
communications. Title I of the ECPA extended that coverage to 
electronic communications. In relevant part, § 2511(1)(a) proscribes 
“intentionally intercept[ing] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication”, unless the intercept is authorized by court order 
or by other exceptions not relevant here. Section 2520 authorizes, 
inter alia, persons whose electronic communications are 
intercepted in violation of § 2511 to bring a civil action against the 
interceptor for actual damages, or for statutory damages of $10,000 
per violation or $100 per day of the violation, whichever is greater. 
18 U.S.C. § 2520.162 
Attempting to invoke the relatively new protections 
afforded by the ECPA, the Steve Jackson Games plaintiffs sued 
the Secret Service, claiming that its review of e-mail messages 
on the confiscated computer violated both Titles of the 
ECPA.163 The district court awarded damages on the plaintiffs’ 
Title II claim, finding that the Secret Service violated the SCA 
by seizing electronic communications (e-mail messages) stored 
on the confiscated computer.164 Their claim under Title I, 
however, failed: “[The court] held that the Secret Service did 
not ‘intercept’ the E-mail in violation of Title I of the ECPA, 18 
                                                          
 161. Id.; see Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2521 (2012); Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012). 
 162. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (footnotes omitted). The Ninth Circuit has also offered a relatively 
pithy summary of the relevant statutory development: 
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, which was intended to 
afford privacy protection to electronic communications. Title I of the 
ECPA amended the federal Wiretap Act, which previously addressed 
only wire and oral communications, to “address the interception 
of . . . electronic communications.” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557. Title II of the ECPA 
created the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which was designed to 
“address[ ] access to stored wire and electronic communications and 
transactional records.” 
Konop, 302 F.3d at 874. 
 163. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 459. The plaintiffs also brought a 
claim under the federal Privacy Protection Act, but that claim, pertinent only 
to searches conducted in the course of governmental criminal investigations, is 
not relevant to this Article and thus is not discussed in any detail here. 
 164. Id. 
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U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), because its acquisition of the contents of 
the electronic communications was not contemporaneous with 
the transmission of those communications.”165 The sole 
question on appeal, then, addressed the propriety of the court’s 
rejection of the Title I claim: “[W]hether the seizure of a 
computer on which is stored private E-mail that has been sent 
to an electronic bulletin board, but not yet read (retrieved) by 
the recipients, constitutes an ‘intercept’ proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(1)(a).”166 The court engaged in a relatively lengthy 
analysis of the issue but ultimately upheld the district court’s 
determination.167 In a holding that paved the way for many 
other decisions that followed, the court concluded that the 
government’s review of the e-mail messages on the confiscated 
computer did not violate the Federal Wiretap Act, as amended 
to include electronic communications, because that statute 
proscribes only “intercept[ion]” that is “contemporaneous 
with . . . transmission.”168 Notwithstanding that the plaintiffs 
had not yet retrieved some of the subject messages, no such 
interception occurred, because the messages were already in 
storage—the “transmission” of them, as contemplated by the 
Wiretap Act, had already transpired.169 
The interpretation of the Wiretap Act and SCA offered by 
the court in Steve Jackson Games informed decisions of 
numerous courts that confronted similar statutory claims in 
the workplace setting in the years that followed. For example, 
in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Steve Jackson Games 
for guidance and adopted similar reasoning in rejecting the 
plaintiff-employee’s Wiretap Act/ECPA claim.170 Plaintiff 
Konop, an airline pilot for defendant Hawaiian Airlines, 
created a website on which he posted criticisms of defendant, 
its officers, and the Air Line Pilots Association union.171 Konop 
limited access to the website by requiring visitors to log in with 
a user name and password, and he provided login credentials 
                                                          
 165. Id. at 459–60. 
 166. Id. at 460. 
 167. See id. at 460–63. 
 168. Id. at 460, 461–63. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876–79 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 171. Id. at 872. 
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only to pilots and other employees of Hawaiian.172 His plan to 
keep the site secret from management officials was foiled, 
though, when a vice president obtained login credentials from a 
willing employee and logged in multiple times to view Konop’s 
content.173 Upon learning of the vice president’s access, Konop 
filed suit, alleging, among other things, violations of the federal 
Wiretap Act and the SCA.174 The district court granted 
summary judgment to defendant, and Konop appealed.175 
Addressing first the Wiretap Act claim, the Ninth Circuit 
on appeal readily concluded that Konop’s website posts 
constituted “electronic communication” within the meaning of 
the statute, but nevertheless upheld the dismissal of that claim 
on grounds no unlawful “interception” occurred.176 In reaching 
its conclusion, the court relied heavily on the interpretation of 
the Act offered in Steve Jackson Games.177 Specifically, the 
Konop court found persuasive the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the ECPA amendment retained stored communications 
within the definition of wire communications but omitted them 
from the definition of electronic communications.178 As such, 
the statute elicited a narrow interpretation, by which electronic 
communications deserve protection only when in transit, and 
not while in storage.179 Because Hawaiian viewed posts on 
Konop’s website only when in storage, and not in transmission, 
his Wiretap Act claim failed.180 
Konop’s SCA claim, however, fared better. The district 
court had likewise granted summary judgment on the claim 
under the SCA, reasoning that although the SCA (not 
surprisingly) protects communications in storage and not just 
in transmission, the statutory exemption for access authorized 
by a “user” of the subject service applied, rendering Hawaiian’s 
access lawful.181 Because the employees who provided login 
credentials to the Hawaiian vice president were deemed 
“users,” the district court reasoned that their involvement 
                                                          
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 872–73. 
 174. Id. at 873. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 876–77, 879. 
 177. Id. at 876–77. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 877–78. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 879–80 (referring to the term of art “user” from 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2701(c)(2) (2000)). 
2014] EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN THE TECH ERA 981 
saved Hawaiian’s conduct under the exemption, and Konop’s 
SCA claim failed.182 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed.183 
The statute defines a “user” as one who both uses the service 
and is duly authorized to do so.184 But because the district 
court never made any findings as to whether the employees 
who provided their login credentials had ever actually used the 
website, the district court’s ruling was flawed.185 The Ninth 
Circuit therefore reversed entry of summary judgment on the 
SCA claim.186 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
in Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., likewise 
adopted the reasoning of Steve Jackson Games, according a 
narrow interpretation to the ECPA so as to protect against only 
interceptions of electronic communications that occur in 
transmission.187 Defendant Nationwide terminated plaintiff 
Fraser’s employment as an insurance agent after searching his 
e-mail to ascertain the veracity of allegations that he was 
revealing company secrets to its competitors.188 He 
subsequently sued in federal district court, alleging that 
Nationwide violated the ECPA when it searched his e-mail.189 
The court relied directly on Steve Jackson Games and Konop in 
affirming the rejection of Fraser’s claim under Title I of the 
ECPA, adopting the same rationale to conclude that an 
employer’s review of e-mail on its own server, even if without 
the sender/recipient-employee’s permission, does not constitute 
unlawful interception within the meaning of the statute 
because the subject communications are no longer in transit, 
but rather are already in storage.190 Furthermore, the court 
likewise rejected Fraser’s claim under Title II of the ECPA (the 
                                                          
 182. Id. at 880. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2)). 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113–14 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
 188. Id. at 110. 
 189. Id. He also brought claims for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, 
conversion, and invasion of privacy, but those claims are not relevant to this 
discussion of the federal statutory provisions. Id. at 110–11. The court 
affirmed dismissal of his conversion and invasion of privacy claims on 
procedural grounds, finding that the assertion of them by amendment was a 
mere dilatory tactic, id. at 116–17, and the court upheld rejection of his 
wrongful termination claim. Id. at 112–13. 
 190. Id. at 113–14. 
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SCA) on grounds that the “provider” exemption of the statute 
applied and protected the employer-provider’s review of the 
employee’s stored messages.191 In very short order, the Third 
Circuit, following the trend well established by the pioneer 
courts that came before it, rejected wholesale the plaintiff-
employee’s attempt to invoke federal statutory protections, 
affirming in the process the employer’s unfettered right to 
access any of the employee’s electronic communications.192 
C. EXTRACTING THE THEME 
Although the facts and circumstances underlying each of 
these “early” technology-related workplace privacy cases 
differs, a persistent theme binds them together. In each and 
every one of these cases, the court took what might be 
described as an “easy way out,” adhering to traditional notions 
of privacy and elementary conceptions of technologies that 
evolve faster than the wheels of justice can turn. In other 
words, shifting paradigms in workplace norms forged ahead in 
an effort to keep pace with the rapid changes in workplace 
technologies, but the courts’ earliest decisions reflect a 
reluctance to keep pace. 
The courts’ decisions in the earliest of these workplace 
privacy cases lay a firm foundation for the theme for the others 
that followed. As the trailblazers, the California Court of 
Appeals in Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp.193 and the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
in Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.194 both embody trepidation at 
confronting unfamiliar media and adhere to traditional notions 
of privacy and elementary conceptions of technology in 
adjudicating the employees’ rights. In Bourke, the employees 
attempted to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 
based on their right to restrict access to their work e-mail 
accounts via password-protection, but the court rejected those 
contentions without explanation, holding that regardless of 
their subjective understandings, their expectations of privacy 
                                                          
 191. Id. at 114–15. 
 192. Id. at 113–15. 
 193. Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 
1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_v_Nissan.html; see 
supra notes 27–44 and accompanying text (discussing Bourke). 
 194. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see supra 
notes 45–82 and accompanying text (discussing Smyth). 
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were not objectively reasonable.195 Similarly, the court in 
Smyth rejected the plaintiff’s privacy claims after his employer 
reviewed e-mail on his company account.196 Even though the 
employer had assured him repeatedly that all e-mail 
communications were confidential and could not be used as 
grounds for termination or disciplinary action, the court 
nevertheless found, quite unequivocally, that any expectation 
of privacy he may have had in the e-mail messages was 
unreasonable and upheld his termination based on their 
content.197 Indeed, the court in Smyth went so far as to declare 
boldly that, with respect to voluntary messages sent over a 
company e-mail system, “[w]e find no privacy interests in such 
communications.”198 In both of these earliest cases, then, the 
court not only gave short shrift to the plaintiffs’ claims of 
privacy in e-mail communication, but it also did so in the face 
of employer assurances to the contrary and with little analysis 
to support its conclusions. Thus, these earliest privacy cases 
together suggest that the first courts to confront privacy claims 
in the context of workplace technologies had little interest in 
delving into either the evolving media or the potential for 
shifting social norms and instead disposed of the claims quickly 
and without regard to the employees’ subjective expectations. 
The next major case to come along, McLaren v. Microsoft 
Corp., follows Smyth and, by distinguishing the traditional 
workplace privacy theories reflected in K-Mart Corp. v. 
Trotti,199 shows remarkable reluctance to extend privacy rights 
recognized in those traditional (physical) settings to modern 
technologies.200 Because the court in McLaren offers a bit more 
insight in the form of reasoning, its decision affords more fertile 
ground for critique than its precursors. The court’s reasoning 
is, however, questionable. For example, the court distinguishes 
McLaren’s e-mail from Trotti’s locker on grounds the locker is 
discrete and separate, while an e-mail inbox is not.201 Because 
                                                          
 195. Bourke, No. B068705. 
 196. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100–01. 
 197. Id. at 99–101. 
 198. Id. at 101. 
 199. K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636–38 (Tex. App. 1984); see 
supra notes 101–12 and accompanying text (discussing Trotti and comparing 
that case with McLaren). 
 200. McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05–97–00824, 1999 WL 339015, at *4 
(Tex. App. May 28, 1999); see supra notes 84–112 and accompanying text 
(discussing McLaren). 
 201. McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4. 
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e-mail messages must cross the threshold of the employer’s 
system before transfer to personal folders became possible, the 
court reasoned, those messages were not private by their very 
nature.202 By contrast, the locker afforded Trotti a separate and 
distinct place to store her “tangible, personal belongings.”203 
The court’s distinction here reveals a fallacy of reasoning. In 
order for the contents of Trotti’s locker to become in storage 
there, those personal belongings, not unlike McLaren’s e-mail 
messages, would of necessity enter the employer’s domain. The 
items stored in the locker did not appear there magically; Trotti 
placed them there only after carrying them into and through 
the threshold of the employer’s building. 
The McLaren court’s approach also defies logic based on 
common lay understandings of how e-mail systems work. The 
court distinguished Trotti on the grounds that K-Mart provided 
the locker “for the specific purpose of storing personal 
belongings, not work items.”204 By contrast, the court reasoned, 
Microsoft provided McLaren’s e-mail “so that he could perform 
the functions of his job.”205 As such, “the e-mail messages 
contained on the company computer were not McLaren’s 
personal property, but were merely an inherent part of the 
office environment.”206 Again, the court’s reasoning is flawed. It 
does not reflect the reality of electronic communications to 
assume that a worker will not make personal use of “personal 
folders” provided on the company’s e-mail system, especially 
when the system invites the user to create a password to 
protect their contents. 
One possible explanation for the flawed nature of the 
court’s analysis in McLaren is that the court simply did not 
(indeed, perhaps even could not) understand the nature or the 
typical use of the technology at issue. While it certainly 
remains true that employers provide employees with e-mail 
accounts and networked computers from which to access them 
in order to enable performance of the employer’s work, it is not 
consistent with reality to assume that, as a result, no personal 
use of the e-mail system occurs.207 Whether the employer 
permits such use is a separate question, but the point remains 
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true that the employee can (indeed, will) send and receive 
personal messages on a company-provided e-mail system.208 
Once that occurs, the employee is likely to store some or all of 
those messages in folders intended for that purpose. This is 
especially so where, as in McLaren, the e-mail system not only 
permits the establishment of “personal folders” but also enables 
the user to create his own password to protect them. 
The courts that followed the trail blazed by Bourke, Smyth, 
and McLaren appeared quite content to stick to the same path, 
adhering to traditional notions of workplace privacy and 
refusing all invitations to extend any privacy protections to 
emerging technologies. The court in Garrity v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. not only followed the lead of the 
precursor decisions, but it did so, at least with respect to the 
plaintiffs’ common-law claims, by adopting wholesale their 
reasoning.209 Indeed, the Garrity court offered very little in the 
way of its own original analysis, citing instead to Smyth and 
McLaren, and then leaping to the conclusion that the plaintiffs 
could not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
company e-mail accounts.210 Like the precedents it followed, 
the Garrity court recognized that the employer had both 
expressly and impliedly, through its actions, indicated that it 
would not inspect employee e-mail (notwithstanding a 
reservation of rights to the contrary), but nevertheless refused 
to accord any common-law privacy rights to the employee 
plaintiffs.211 
The Garrity court also refused to break any new ground in 
employee privacy under the statutes the plaintiffs had invoked. 
As to the statutory claims, it is difficult to say whether the 
refusal to recognize employee privacy in workplace electronic 
communications stemmed from a deep-seated reluctance to do 
so as a general matter, or instead was an inevitable conclusion 
in light of the underlying source laws—the antiquated statutes 
that had not kept pace with the evolving technologies. In that 
respect, Garrity and the other principal statutory cases from 
                                                          
 208. See id.  
 209. Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); see supra notes 113–
30 and accompanying text (discussing Garrity). 
 210. See Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2. 
 211. Id. at *2 (“Even if plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their work e-mail, defendant’s legitimate business interest in protecting its 
employees from harassment in the workplace would likely trump plaintiffs’ 
privacy interests.”). 
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the “early” era,212 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,213 and 
Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,214 are all cut from 
the same cloth. Though Garrity addressed state statutes, while 
the claims in Konop and Fraser invoked federal law, the courts’ 
treatment of those claims and interpretation of the similar 
statutes fall directly in line with one another.215 In each of 
those cases, the court followed the lead of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games 
v. U.S. Secret Service,216 interpreting the wiretap statute 
invoked by the plaintiff narrowly so as not to reach the 
employer’s review of the employee’s e-mail on grounds the 
messages in the employee’s inbox (or e-mail folders, as the case 
may be), could not be “intercepted” within the meaning of the 
subject statute, because such messages were no longer “in 
transmission.”217 
Whatever reticence the courts in those early statutory 
cases might have felt when it came to charting new territory in 
employee workplace privacy, the statutes on which the 
plaintiffs were forced (absent any more readily applicable 
remedy) to rely likely obviated the results those courts reached, 
because the statutes themselves were highly antiquated and 
thus ill-equipped to address the needs of the rapidly evolving 
workplace. Indeed, in each of the subject cases, the plaintiffs 
attempted to carve out protections for communications made in 
a form that not only did not exist but indeed could not have 
been contemplated when the statutes themselves were enacted. 
Both the Massachusetts Wiretap Act invoked by the Garrity 
plaintiffs, and the Federal Wiretap Act relied upon by the 
plaintiffs in Konop and Fraser, had their origins in the war 
waged against organized crime in the 1960s.218 As such, the 
                                                          
 212. See supra Part I.A–B (identifying and discussing cases from the 1990s 
and early 2000s as comprising “early” workplace technology cases). 
 213. 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra notes 170–86 and 
accompanying text (discussing Konop). 
 214. 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003); see supra notes 187–92 and accompanying 
text (discussing Fraser). 
 215. Compare Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3 (addressing the state 
wiretap statute), with Konop, 302 F.3d at 874–80 (addressing the federal 
wiretap statute), and Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113–15 (same). 
 216. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); see supra notes 151–69 and accompanying 
text (discussing Steve Jackson Games). 
 217. Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113–14; Konop, 302 F.3d at 876–79; Garrity, 302 
F.3d at *3. 
 218. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555, 3556 (discussing origins of the Wiretap Act as part of the Omnibus 
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statutes addressed only those forms of communication that 
existed at the time, focusing on the telephone.219 Congress 
recognized these shortcomings and amended the federal statute 
in 1986 in an attempt to address modern technological 
advances, extending its protections to encompass “electronic” 
communications in addition to wire and oral ones, and covering 
not only such communications “in transmission” but also in 
storage.220 In crafting the revised protections, Congress 
recognized the rapid evolution of the underlying technology, 
emphasizing the advent of communications via computer, 
computer networks, and private telephone lines.221 But in the 
                                                          
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); Garrity, 302 F.3d at *3 
(indicating that the Massachusetts Wiretap Act is similar in purpose to its 
federal counterpart). 
 219. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556 
(“[The Wiretap Act’s] regimen for protecting the privacy of voice 
communications is expressly limited to the unauthorized aural interception of 
wire or oral communications. It only applies where the contents of a 
communication can be overheard and understood by the human ear. 
Furthermore, [it] applies only to interceptions of communications sent via 
common carriers.” (citation omitted)). 
 220. Konop, 302 F.3d at 874 (discussing the 1986 amendment of the 
Wiretap Act to encompass interception and storage of electronic 
communications). 
 221. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555–
57. The Senate Report described well the advancements and the concomitant 
need for statutory revision: 
Today we have large-scale electronic mail operations, computer-
to-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless telephones, 
paging devices, and video teleconferencing. A phone call can be 
carried by wire, by microwave or fiber optics. It can be transmitted in 
the form of digitized voice, data or video. Since the divestiture of 
AT&T and deregulation, many different companies, not just common 
carriers, offer a wide variety of telephone and other communications 
services. It does not make sense that a phone call transmitted via 
common carrier is protected by the current federal wiretap statute, 
while the same phone call transmitted via a private telephone 
network such as those used by many major U.S. corporations today, 
would not be covered by the statute. 
These tremendous advances in telecommunications and 
computer technologies have carried with them comparable 
technological advances in surveillance devices and techniques. 
Electronic hardware making it possible for overzealous law 
enforcement agencies, industrial spies and private parties to intercept 
the personal or proprietary communications of others are readily 
available in the American market today. 
Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act addresses 
the interception of wire, oral and electronic communications. It 
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world of technology and electronic communications, what is 
“modern” one day is often antiquated the next. As such, the 
statutory revisions Congress made in 1986 were effectively 
outdated almost before they became effective, and certainly 
have not kept pace with the rapid and extensive changes that 
have occurred in the intervening quarter century.222 Indeed, 
the statutes remain today in effectively the same form that 
they existed after the 1986 amendments.223 As the Konop court 
explained well, the statutes are therefore wholly inadequate 
when it comes to redressing modern technological 
advancements: 
As we have previously observed, the intersection of [the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Communications Act, 
both enacted as revisions to the Wiretap Act] is a complex, often 
convoluted, area of the law. In the present case, the difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that the ECPA was written prior to the 
advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the 
existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms 
of communication like Konop’s secure website. Courts have 
struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology within 
the confines of this statutory framework, often with unsatisfying 
results. We observe that until Congress brings the laws in line with 
modern technology, protection of the Internet and websites such as 
Konop’s will remain a confusing and uncertain area of the law.224 
Given these obvious inadequacies, it should come as no 
surprise that plaintiffs attempting to carve out protections in 
light of modern technologies have almost uniformly failed when 
attempting to rely on the antiquities of the statutory regime. 
As the Konop court forthrightly recognized—and then over a 
decade ago—the statutes will remain a wholly inadequate 
source of guidance when it comes to the rights and 
responsibilities of employees and employers in the modern 
workplace, at least until Congress succeeds in revising the laws 
to meet the rapidly evolving technologies.225 While Congress 
                                                          
amends existing chapter 119 of title 18 to bring it in line with 
technological developments and changes in the structure of the 
telecommunications industry. 
Id. 
 222. See Security and Surveillance, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 
https://www.cdt.org/issue/wiretap-ecpa (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (discussing 
the impact of cloud storage and location tracking for mobile devices). 
 223. See id. 
 224. Konop, 302 F.3d at 874 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 225. See id. 
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has yet to confront the problem head on, though, new avenues 
may nevertheless be emerging. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WORKER PRIVACY 
Change is afoot. In the latter part of the new millennium’s 
first decade, the law of worker privacy began what appears to 
be a modern evolution, pacing behind but nevertheless 
reflective of shifting social norms as technology growth 
burgeoned, and its use in and beyond the workplace became 
pervasive. The evolution is far from complete, and remains in a 
state of vulnerable infancy. Its trajectory is likely to change 
many times in the decades to come. Yet, the trends reflected in 
the law are unmistakable, and suggest that as the use of 
technology becomes increasingly widespread, the law may 
follow in recognizing the need for some privacy protections that 
did not previously exist.226 
This Part discusses recent developments in the law 
concerning employee privacy in workplace technologies, and 
suggests that the trend appears to be favoring broader 
recognition of employee privacy in at least those uses of 
technology that are becoming the most widely accepted. 
Venturing into uncharted territory, a few progressive courts led 
the way by acknowledging for the first time that employees 
may reasonably expect privacy in workplace technologies.227 
Following that trend, some courts have found new paths 
around antiquated statutes to carve out new rights, while state 
legislatures have begun enacting new laws to protect their 
constituents in the modernizing world.228 These common-law 
and statutory trends are also bleeding over into the realm of 
administrative law, as agencies have followed suit by 
recognizing that employees may retain privacy rights to protect 
their online social networking, even when it directly impacts 
the workplace.229 This section discusses each of these 
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developments in turn and reveals in the process a distinct 
trend away from the reluctance and trepidation of the prior 
generation, in favor of broader privacy rights for the high-tech 
workforce. 
A. THE COMMON-LAW TRAILBLAZERS 
The evolution of workplace privacy rights in emerging 
technologies began when a few trailblazing judges became the 
first to recognize that employees may reasonably expect privacy 
in e-mail sent over or accessed on company equipment. 
Remarkably, some of these judges recognized such privacy 
expectations even in the face of published company policies 
attempting to defeat those very expectancies. As the first, or at 
least foremost, courts to balk the firmly entrenched disdain for 
worker privacy in emerging technologies that permeated the 
law of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, their 
decisions paved the path for further evolution that has 
indubitably begun but has yet to reach fruition. The cases 
discussed below, while not the only ones that might fall into 
this category, typify and exemplify the shifting norms of the 
modern era. 
1. State and Federal Court Decisions According Broader 
Common-Law Privacy Rights 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York led the way into the modern era of workplace 
privacy by condoning employee privacy claims in e-mail 
messages accessed on company equipment, notwithstanding 
the employer’s policy attempting to defeat any expectation of 
privacy.230 Notably, the context for that court’s 2008 decision in 
Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp departed 
from the traditional model by which the earlier privacy cases 
came to the attention of the courts. The privacy issue in Pure 
Power Boot Camp arose not as the central tenet of the 
plaintiffs’ claims, as it had in the wrongful discharge and 
invasion of privacy cases of the “early” era,231 but instead as a 
                                                          
National Labor Relations Board on behalf of an employee fired after 
complaining about her boss on her Facebook account). 
 230. See Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. 
Supp. 2d 548, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 231. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing early cases involving claims to worker 
privacy in new technologies, such as Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp. (rejecting 
claims for common-law and constitutional invasion of privacy), and Smyth v. 
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peripheral matter raised via an evidentiary objection.232 
Indeed, the central claims in that case did not involve worker 
privacy at all. Instead, the plaintiff Pure Power Boot Camp 
(PPBC), which formerly employed the individual defendants, 
sued them and the competing fitness center (defendant Warrior 
Fitness Boot Camp) they had recently opened, bringing various 
claims for breach of restrictive covenants, breach of fiduciary 
duties, and infringement of trademarks, trade dress, and 
copyrights.233 The plaintiffs attempted to rely in the course of 
the litigation on thirty-four e-mail messages obtained by PPBC 
representatives from an individual defendant’s e-mail accounts, 
but the defendants objected on privacy grounds.234 
The context in which the privacy issue arose in Pure Power 
Boot Camp made it a good candidate to begin shifting the tide 
away from reluctance and toward acceptance of employee 
privacy in e-mail. First, as explained above, the issue arose as a 
peripheral evidentiary matter and not as the foundation of the 
plaintiffs’ claims. As such, at least arguably, the court could 
approach the privacy law aspect somewhat more aggressively, 
without having to depart blatantly from established precedents 
or disregard principles of stare decisis. Moreover, the factual 
context made it a persuasive case for recognition of employee 
privacy rights because, unlike in many of the “early era” 
cases,235 it was not clear that the subject employee e-mails had 
been created on employer equipment or during the employee’s 
working hours.236 PPBC gained access to the subject e-mail 
messages, which were sent from the defendant’s personal web-
based e-mail accounts (Gmail.com, Hotmail.com, and 
warriorfitnessbootcamp.com, an account on his new employer’s 
domain), after he left his Hotmail username and password 
stored on PPBC’s computers.237 Because he used the same 
                                                          
Pillsbury Co. (dismissing a privacy-based claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy)). 
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password for his other e-mail accounts, PPBC was able to 
access those accounts as well.238 Thus, the employee had used 
his employer’s computer to access his personal e-mail at one 
time, but there was otherwise no proof that he used company 
equipment to create the subject messages on a later date, or 
that he did so while he was working.239 Chiefly relying on these 
facts, the court concluded that the defendant reasonably 
expected privacy in the e-mail messages he sent, received, and 
stored on his personal accounts, even though he had not only 
accessed those accounts on employer equipment but had also 
saved his password there, enabling one-click account entry by 
anyone who could turn on the computer.240 What is more, the 
court recognized these privacy rights, in the face of an 
employer policy that expressly negated any privacy rights or 
expectations in any e-mail that passed through the company’s 
computer system.241 
The reduced connection in Pure Power Boot Camp between 
the e-mail messages in which the (here, former) employee 
claimed privacy, on the one hand, and the employer’s 
workplace, on the other, opened the door for the court to confer 
greater privacy-based protection than had been recognized in 
the technology-based privacy cases that preceded it.242 And yet, 
the principles that the court announced and the analytical 
approach it took leave room for courts to follow its lead in 
subsequent cases, expanding the privacy rights that the Pure 
Power Boot Camp court initially pronounced. Of chief 
importance in that regard is the fact that the court recognized 
privacy rights in the face of an employer policy attempting to 
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defeat any such expectation or claim.243 In reaching that 
conclusion, the court distinguished the facts of the case before 
it from those in which courts had relied directly on similar 
policies to reject employee privacy claims, on grounds the 
PPBC employee had not actually stored any of the subject e-
mail messages on company equipment and likely had not even 
sent the messages from, or received them on, employer 
equipment.244 Yet, the employee had not only accessed his 
personal account on PPBC’s computer, but he had also gone so 
far as to store his password there as well, leaving the door wide 
open to any person who powered it on.245 The court dismissed 
these facts as essentially irrelevant, though, holding that 
saving the password did not confer implied consent to access 
the account’s contents, and that his privacy expectation in the 
personal account therefore remained intact.246 As such, the 
Pure Power Boot Camp decision charts new territory, by 
comparison to the “early era” cases discussed above, in that it 
upholds an employee’s right to privacy in the face of a policy 
attempting to directly defeat the same, and when the employee 
had himself essentially provided the employer the “key” to his 
account by saving his password on company equipment.247 
Moreover, the decision also sets a strong precedent concerning 
the strength of privacy claims in the context of technologies 
established personally by the employee (here, personal web-
based e-mail accounts), even when the employee accesses those 
technologies on the employer’s equipment or network, and even 
where the employee provides sufficient information to allow the 
employer ready access. 
Subsequent courts addressing employee privacy claims in 
similar yet distinct contexts seemed to follow the lead of the 
Pure Power Boot Camp court in expanding common law 
protections of employees’ technology-based privacy rights, even 
if they did not rely on that case expressly. For example, in 
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, the court held that the 
plaintiff-employees had proffered sufficient evidence to reach a 
jury on their claims that the employer invaded reasonably 
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expected privacy when it accessed a website created by and for 
the employees for the purpose of “vent[ing] about . . . work 
without any outside eyes spying in on us.”248 The plaintiffs, 
former employees of the defendant company that operated a 
Houston’s restaurant where they had worked, were discharged 
after management discovered postings on an employee-run 
Myspace.com page that management found “offensive” as well 
as contradictory to the restaurant’s core values of 
“professionalism, positive mental attitude, aim to please 
approach, and teamwork.”249 The plaintiffs had set up the page 
as a forum in which employees could share frustrations about 
their jobs.250 Management gained access to the page when one 
of the member-employees shared her password with them.251 
After the company terminated their employment due to the 
offensive content found on the Myspace.com page, the plaintiffs 
sued, bringing both statutory and common law claims.252 
Unlike the predecessor plaintiffs of the earlier era, the 
Houston’s plaintiffs received a warmer reception to their 
privacy pleas. Indeed, not only did the plaintiffs’ privacy claims 
survive an early motion to dismiss253—the stage at which 
several of the early-era claims faltered254—but they even 
triumphed over a motion for summary judgment, with the next 
stop the proverbial plaintiffs’ promised land of a trial by jury.255 
Specifically, four of plaintiffs’ claims, all with privacy 
implications, survived defendant’s summary judgment motion: 
statutory claims under the federal Stored Communications Act 
and its state-law counterpart, a tort claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy premised on an alleged 
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). 
 255. See Pietrylo, 2008 WL 6085437, at *3–7. 
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invasion of privacy, and a tort claim for invasion of privacy 
standing alone.256 
As to the statutory claims, the court focused on the fact 
that the employee who granted access to management by 
sharing her password did so only out of concern for her job, 
fearing that adverse employment action may be taken if she 
did not comply.257 In light of her testimony that she felt 
pressured into sharing her password in order to protect her job, 
the court concluded that a genuine issue of fact existed 
concerning whether her consent was voluntary.258 Suggesting 
that consent offered only under duress would not constitute the 
requisite authorization to afford a liability exemption under the 
statutes, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.259 Thus, the court readily found an avenue by which 
it could permit the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed. 
The plaintiffs’ common-law claims met with similar 
success, affording an even starker contrast to the fate of 
comparable claims brought in the early era. First, quite unlike 
the first courts to confront the issue, the Pietrylo court readily 
concluded that “[a] right to privacy may be a source of ‘a clear 
mandate of public policy’ that could support a claim for 
wrongful termination.”260 Moreover, the court did not hesitate 
in finding that the plaintiffs reasonably expected privacy in 
their “invitation-only internet discussion space,”261 
notwithstanding that the employees used the company logo to 
label the page and gathered together there only because of 
their workplace connection.262 Again relying on facts 
concerning the conditions under which the managers gained 
access to the site, the court concluded that a disputed issue of 
material fact regarding authorization necessitated resolution 
by trial.263 Similarly, the authorization issue precluded 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ common-law invasion of 
privacy claim, as well.264 And unlike the predecessor courts of 
the earlier era, the Pietrylo court readily concluded that the 
                                                          
 256. See id. at *3–7. 
 257. See id. at *4. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at *6. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. at *1. 
 263. See id. at *6. 
 264. Id. at *7. 
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employees might have reasonably expected privacy in their 
postings, even though the site existed on the World Wide Web, 
because of the fact that the employees protected it with a 
password.265 In that respect, the Pietrylo case stands in stark 
contrast to the cases of the early era, in which courts tended to 
swiftly reject employee privacy claims even as to messages sent 
on individual employees’ e-mail accounts, which are at least 
arguably more prone to expectations of privacy than postings to 
a web site.266 What was wholly inadequate to survive an out-of-
the-gates motion to dismiss in the early era, became readily 
sufficient to support the claim’s viability not only at the initial 
stages but even all the way to trial. 
The trajectory toward increasingly open reception to 
employee privacy claims stemming from technology use 
reached new heights in the 2010 New Jersey Supreme Court 
case, Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.267 Perhaps most 
notably, and consistent with the approach of other modern-era 
courts, the Stengart court gave short shrift to the employer’s 
policy unequivocally negating any expectation of privacy in 
actions taken on company computer equipment.268 Instead, the 
court dismissed the published policy as irrelevant because the 
employee sent and received the subject e-mail messages via her 
own personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail account, 
even though she did so on the company’s equipment, as 
expressly contemplated by the policy.269 Indeed, although the 
context of the privacy issue in Stengart bore striking 
similarities to that presented in the case decided just two years 
earlier by the neighboring New York federal district court in 
Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp,270 the 
                                                          
 265. See id. Indeed, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed concerning whether the employees reasonably expected privacy in 
their web postings. Id. 
 266. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing courts’ swift rejection of 
employee privacy claims stemming from employers’ review of employee e-mail 
messages). 
 267. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010). 
 268. See id. at 657–58; see also Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness 
Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting employer’s 
claim that policy purporting to negate expectation of privacy was effective as 
to e-mail messages sent on employee’s personal, password-protected, web-
based e-mail account). 
 269. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 657. 
 270. See Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 552–53; supra notes 
230–47 and accompanying text (discussing Pure Power Boot Camp). 
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Stengart court arguably extended its recognition of privacy 
rights even further. 
As in Pure Power Boot Camp, the privacy issue in Stengart 
did not form the foundation of the plaintiff’s lawsuit, but 
instead arose out of a discovery dispute.271 The plaintiff, 
Marina Stengart, sued her former employer, defendant Loving-
Care Agency, alleging constructive discharge, harassment, and 
retaliation.272 After she filed suit, Loving Care hired a 
computer forensic expert to mine data off the company laptop 
she had used during her employment, and found a number of e-
mail messages exchanged between Stengart and her attorney 
via her personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail 
account.273 When Loving Care relied on those e-mail messages 
during discovery, Stengart objected, asserting the attorney-
client privilege and seeking return of the e-mails.274 
The trial court’s decision tracked more closely the 
sentiments of the earlier era, triumphing employer prerogative 
over employee rights, but the appellate courts found 
otherwise.275 The company’s Electronic Communication Policy, 
which carried the day at the trial court, purported to negate 
any expectation of privacy in any use to which an employee 
might put her company-issued equipment: 
The company reserves and will exercise the right to review, audit, 
intercept, access, and disclose all matters on the company’s media 
systems and services at any time, with or without notice . . . . E-
mail and voice mail messages, internet use and communication and 
computer files are considered part of the company’s business and 
client records. Such communications are not to be considered 
private or personal to any individual employee.276 
According to the trial court, because the policy expressly stated 
that Internet communications on company equipment were 
“not to be considered private or personal,” plaintiff Stengart 
could not claim any protection—via the attorney-client 
privilege or otherwise—of her e-mails sent on her laptop.277 The 
court of appeals, and eventually the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, however, disagreed.278 Reading the employer’s policy 
                                                          
 271. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 655. 
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 276. Id. at 657. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. at 655. 
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narrowly in favor of employee rights, the appellate courts held 
instead that Stengart retained an expectation of privacy in her 
webmail communications, based primarily on its conclusion 
that the employer’s policy did not address “personal [e-mail] 
accounts.”279 Because she did not expect that the company 
could and would access the personal webmail she sent on her 
company laptop, she did not waive the attorney-client privilege 
when she used that equipment to send the subject messages.280 
As such, the Stengart court, consistent with other modern-era 
decisions, stepped out from the bonds of employer prerogative 
that led to broad application of electronic communication 
policies in the early era, and readily concluded instead that 
because the subject policy did not expressly describe the 
employer’s ability to access any Internet usage on its own 
equipment, the policy simply did not govern.281 
2. Supreme Court Instruction—Or the Lack Thereof 
Taken together, the cases discussed above—Pure Power 
Boot Camp,282 Pietrylo,283 and Stengart284—though far from the 
only decisions on the subject in recent years, represent well the 
modern consensus and its trend away from the trepidation 
reflected in decisions rendered in the earlier years of the 
modern technological era. In each of those three representative 
cases, the court employed traditional common law doctrine 
concerning employees’ expectations of privacy, but departed 
                                                          
 279. See id. at 657. 
 280. See id. at 663–65. 
 281. See id. The Stengart court also discussed other similar decisions that 
might fairly be grouped along with it as representative of the trend toward 
increasing recognition of employee privacy rights in the modern era. See, e.g., 
In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 259 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding that because employer policy purporting to ban personal use of e-mail 
and allowing monitoring was “equivocal,” employee could claim attorney-client 
privilege in e-mail messages exchanged with lawyer over company e-mail 
system); Memorandum and Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel at *3, Nat’l 
Econ. Research Assocs., Inc. v. Evans, 2006 WL 2440008 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 3, 2006) (No. 04-2618-BLS2) (finding that employee had reasonable 
expectation of privacy in webmail messages sent on company computer 
because employer’s Internet communications policy “did not expressly declare 
that it would monitor the content of Internet communications”). 
 282. Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 
2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see supra notes 230–47 and accompanying text. 
 283. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1 
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008); see supra notes 248–66 and accompanying text. 
 284. Stengart, 990 A.2d 650; see supra notes 267–81 and accompanying 
text. 
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from the reluctant ways of the predecessor courts by narrowly 
interpreting employer monitoring policies or otherwise finding 
that employee privacy rights prevailed notwithstanding 
employers’ attempts to defeat them.285 These representative 
cases paint a thorough picture of the shifting norms that 
underlie the modern era, but a discussion of cases addressing 
the courts’ approach to common-law notions of privacy 
expectations would not be complete without at least mentioning 
the United States Supreme Court’s dabbling in this arena. And 
while the High Court’s decisions that address reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the workplace typically arise in the 
context of constitutional questions relevant only in the public 
workplace—a body of law that lies only at the periphery of this 
Article—its instruction is nevertheless pertinent, as other 
courts interpreting the common law often look to the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in the constitutional setting for 
guidance.286 
The Supreme Court’s body of law assessing employee 
privacy in the public workplace setting is relatively rich both in 
history and in depth, but it is the Court’s 2010 decision in City 
of Ontario v. Quon that is most relevant here.287 The Court’s 
decision in Quon—or, perhaps more accurately, its refusal to 
reach any decision about privacy expectations—failed to 
provide the instruction that many hoped it would afford, but is 
nevertheless not entirely useless. Indeed, the Court’s 
discussion of privacy expectations might best be characterized 
as paving the way for courts to follow the lead of those 
discussed above in taking a more aggressive, and progressive, 
approach to issues of employee workplace privacy in the 
technological era. 
Quon is especially pertinent here because it was the first 
Supreme Court case to address employee privacy rights in 
workplace technologies. Jeff Quon, a police officer and SWAT 
Team member in the city of Ontario, California, sued the City 
alleging constitutional violations after City officials reviewed 
                                                          
 285. See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
 286. See, e.g., Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 897–99 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing, at length, case law on workplace privacy 
rights, dismissing that body of law as not directly relevant to the private 
setting, but proceeding to apply principles announced in those cases to assess 
plaintiff’s privacy claims). 
 287. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
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text messages sent and received on his City-issued pager.288 
Prior to issuing the employee pagers, the City announced a 
“Computer Usage, Internet, and E-mail Policy,” reserving the 
City’s right to monitor “all network activity” and specifying 
that “[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or 
confidentiality when using these resources.”289 Although the 
policy did not apply on its face to text messages, the City 
announced on several occasions that it would accord the same 
treatment to text messages as it did to e-mail and other 
network usages.290 In addition, a supervisor expressly told 
Quon “that messages sent on the pagers were ‘considered e-
mail and could be audited,’” though that same supervisor also 
went on to explain that “it was not his intent to audit [an] 
employee’s text messages to see if the overage [was] due to 
work related transmissions.”291 When Quon regularly exceeded 
the monthly character limitation on his text messaging plan, 
his superiors in the police department attempted to ascertain 
whether the overages warranted an increase in his character 
allotment.292 In order to make that determination, the 
department obtained text-message transcripts from Arch 
Wireless, the third-party service provider, and reviewed them 
for content.293 In an apparent effort to preserve Quon’s privacy, 
the officer consulted Quon’s work schedule and redacted any 
messages sent during non-working hours, but nevertheless 
found that the majority of messages sent and received on 
Quon’s pager, even during work hours, did not pertain to his 
job.294 The City disciplined Quon as a result of these 
findings.295 
Of central significance here is the Court’s discussion of 
Quon’s privacy expectations in this setting, which arose as an 
                                                          
 288. See id. at 750–53. 
 289. Id. at 751. 
 290. See id. at 751–52. 
 291. Id. at 752. 
 292. See id. at 752. 
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 294. Id. at 753. The officer’s report noted that:  
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issue as part of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the City 
violated his constitutional protections against unlawful 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.296 The Court’s 
precedents addressing employee privacy in the public 
workplace had not yielded a consensus rule concerning either 
the requisite proof to make out a claim, or the parameters of 
reasonable privacy expectations pertinent thereto.297 Instead, 
the Court’s only precedents had failed to garner support of a 
sufficient majority of justices to elicit a majority rule.298 In 
particular, the 1987 decision in O’Connor v. Ortega, although 
the seminal authority on the privacy rights of public employees 
under the Fourth Amendment, emerged as only a plurality 
opinion.299 A four-justice plurality, led by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, favored a two-step process for the assessment of 
public employees’ Fourth Amendment rights.300 According to 
the plurality, a court must first consider “‘[t]he operational 
realities of the workplace’ in order to determine whether an 
employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. On this 
view, ‘the question whether an employee has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case 
basis.’”301 If such an expectation can reasonably be found, then, 
according to the plurality, a court should proceed to determine 
whether an employer’s intrusion on that expectation is 
reasonable under the circumstances.302 This two-part test did 
not, however, become the definitive rule, because it failed to 
garner support from a majority of justices. The other view, 
espoused and articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia, “would 
have dispensed with an inquiry into ‘operational realities’ and 
would conclude ‘that offices of government employees . . . are 
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general 
                                                          
 296. Id. Quon also brought claims under the Stored Communications Act, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006), as well as California state law, but those 
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matter.”303 Justice Scalia would then have proceeded directly to 
an assessment of the reasonableness of the search itself, with 
the instruction “that government searches to retrieve work-
related materials or to investigate violations of workplace 
rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and 
normal in the private-employer context—do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.”304 Thus, while the plurality would have 
conducted a threshold inquiry into whether the employee 
reasonably expected privacy, Justice Scalia would assume that 
expectation and consider only whether the search was 
reasonable, tapping into private-workplace norms in making 
that assessment. 
In the nearly quarter century that passed between 
O’Connor and the Court’s grant of certiorari in Quon, the lower 
courts floundered in the absence of a majority rule concerning 
the governing framework.305 Many adopted the plurality 
approach, thereby necessitating inquiry into the employee’s 
privacy expectations.306 Whether the “right” approach or not, 
the plurality’s two-part test has the advantage of fostering 
development of the law concerning the reasonableness of 
employee privacy expectations which, although not directly 
binding in common-law cases, is nevertheless instructive. Thus, 
many hoped that when the Supreme Court granted review of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Quon, it would not only answer 
the proof-structure question left open after Ortega, but would 
also provide some of that very sort of instruction concerning 
employee privacy in the age of technology.307 
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Unfortunately, the speculators were disappointed. 
Although the case did produce a majority opinion, it did not 
resolve the open question concerning the proof framework 
applicable to public employee Fourth Amendment cases.308 
Instead, the Court dodged that question by concluding that the 
search was reasonable, thereby obviating the need for inquiry 
into whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy or 
not.309 As such, “[t]he two O’Connor approaches—the plurality’s 
and Justice Scalia’s—therefore lead to the same result.”310 No 
answer emerged, and the lingering proof-framework question 
remains open. 
The Court’s failure to resolve the open proof-framework 
question is disappointing, but what is even more troublesome, 
at least for purposes of this Article, is the absence of any useful 
guidance in the opinion about reasonable expectations of 
privacy in workplace technologies. There was no need to 
address that issue at all, given the majority’s conclusion that 
the search was reasonable regardless of Quon’s expectations.311 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of “instruct[ion],” the majority went 
on to discuss whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the text messages on his pager.312 However, its 
“instruction” fell far short of deserving that label. The most 
instructive point that can be gleaned from the Court’s dictum is 
that in assessing privacy expectations, workplace policies and 
practices matter.313 That point, however, is far from novel. 
Indeed, nearly every one of the cases discussed above 
addressed the employer’s policy concerning technology use as 
relevant to the employee’s privacy expectations, at least in 
some respect.314 Beyond that point, the Court expressly refused 
to delve any further, reciting the rapid evolution of technology 
                                                          
Quon . . . many scholars, judges, and practitioners hoped that the Quon 
decision would clarify the uncertainties left over from O’Connor and resolve 
new issues created by electronic communications technology. On the other 
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 308. Quon, 560 U.S. at 757. 
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 312. Id. at 758–59. 
 313. Id. at 758. 
 314. See, e.g., supra Parts I.A.1, II.A.1. 
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as good reason to avoid broaching the topic of a legal response 
to it.315 Indeed, the Court went on at some length here, taking 
pains to make clear its trepidation about resolving questions 
concerning privacy expectations in the face of rapidly shifting 
social norms: 
The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole 
concept of privacy expectations in communications made on 
electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The 
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in 
society has become clear . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Cell phone and text message communications are so 
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential 
means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-
identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of 
privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made 
them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees 
who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can 
purchase and pay for their own. And employer policies concerning 
communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of 
their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are 
clearly communicated.316 
Thus, the Court stated that it was loathe to dictate the 
parameters of proper inquiry into privacy expectations in 
workplace technologies, but it nevertheless proceeded to do 
much of what it disclaimed. The Court identified a variety of 
relevant factors, including the employer’s policies and 
communications to employees, the pervasiveness of the subject 
technologies, and society’s expectations about them at large, 
but it did so without supplying any real parameters to guide 
the inquiry.317 The result is therefore subjectivity and lack of 
predictability. 
The Court’s refusal to address privacy expectations on 
grounds that it must proceed cautiously due to the rapid 
evolution of the relevant technologies is somewhat ironic given 
that the very technologies at stake—text messages sent via 
paging devices—were heavily antiquated by the time the Court 
rendered its decision. Justice Scalia, concurring in the 
judgment, boldly chastised the majority for its timidity: 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may 
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we 
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have no choice. The Court’s implication . . . that where electronic 
privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise 
would (that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve 
the case and guide private action)—or that we should hedge our 
bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque 
opinions—is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-a-
changin’ is a feeble excuse for the disregard of duty.318 
According to Justice Scalia, then, the majority went too far in 
“instructing” about privacy expectations at all.319 Moreover, the 
instruction itself elicited his negative response on grounds that 
it will cause lower courts to flounder in their analysis of privacy 
issues and reach erroneous results more often than not.320 As is 
often the case, Justice Scalia’s point is best made by extracting 
his very words: 
Worse still, the digression is self-defeating. Despite the Court’s 
insistence that it is agnostic about the proper test, lower courts will 
likely read the Court’s self-described “instructive” expatiation on 
how the O’Connor plurality’s approach would apply here (if it 
applied) as a heavy-handed hint about how they should proceed. 
Litigants will do likewise, using the threshold question whether 
the Fourth Amendment is even implicated as a basis for 
bombarding lower courts with arguments about employer policies, 
how they were communicated, and whether they were authorized, 
as well as the latest trends in employees’ use of electronic media. 
In short, in saying why it is not saying more, the Court says much 
more than it should.321 
Given the ambiguity in the non-exhaustive list of relevant 
considerations that the majority offered in its dictum, Justice 
Scalia’s criticisms have some resonance. As discussed in Part 
III below, his suggestion that any standard necessitating a 
subjective inquiry into the norms surrounding rapidly evolving 
technologies makes some sense, and may imply a route out of 
the maze of complicated legal questions in this area of the law. 
B. REINTERPRETATION OF OLD STATUTES AND ENACTMENT OF 
NEW ONES 
The modern era in the law of employee privacy ushered in 
more expansive interpretations of common-law notions of 
privacy, as the cases discussed in the preceding section 
illustrate. Expansion of rights under the common law is not the 
only path by which the law in this area is evolving, though. 
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Statutes applicable to workplace technologies are also 
supplying greater privacy protection. While courts afford 
broader or otherwise more protective interpretations to the 
antiquated statutes that have been on the books for some 
period of time, legislative bodies at both the state and federal 
level are also responding to the evolution of workplace 
technologies and social norms. This section addresses both 
avenues of expansion, discussing representative cases 
according more protective interpretations to pre-existing 
statutes as well as statutory reform efforts. 
1. Modernized Interpretation of Antiquated Statutes 
It is beyond objection that the existing statutory 
framework relevant to employee privacy in workplace 
technologies is highly antiquated and ill-suited to answer the 
legal questions that arise in the modern era.322 Indeed, the only 
relevant federal statutes, enacted in 1986, are approaching 
thirty years old and pre-date the advent of the Internet and 
World Wide Web.323 Those statutes, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)324 and Stored 
Communications Act (SCA),325 originally afforded little to no 
protection for employees seeking a privacy refuge, as discussed 
in much more detail in Part I of this Article.326 That is, the 
ECPA was interpreted to protect only against interception of 
communications contemporaneous with transmission.327 As 
such, it typically had no application with respect to e-mail 
communications, which are nearly always accessed only after 
delivery to the intended recipient’s account.328 The SCA, as its 
name connotes, does afford protection to electronic 
communications after they are in storage.329 However, the 
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statute also contains sufficient exceptions such that employers 
can nearly always mount a ready defense to any employee’s 
claim of its violation, either as the provider of the business’s 
network services, or on grounds an employee user has in one 
fashion or another provided requisite statutory authorization to 
permit the employer access.330 
The constrained interpretations that bound the first courts 
attempting to apply these antiquated statutes to modern 
technologies seem to be giving way to more protective 
interpretations in recent years. Thus, although the statutes 
remain outdated and cry out for revision, some courts have 
more recently found ways to afford greater protection to 
employees, even within the antiquated structure. An example 
of this phenomenon is Steinbach v. Village of Forest Park.331 
Plaintiff Steinbach was Commissioner of the Village of Forest 
Park, Illinois, an elected position.332 When she then ran against 
the incumbent Mayor, she discovered that someone had 
accessed her Forest Park e-mail account and forwarded to the 
incumbent Mayor eleven e-mail messages she had received 
from her constituents.333 Upon making this discovery, she sued 
the Village, its Mayor, and its IT employee, alleging various 
privacy-based claims.334 The defendants responded with a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), but unlike the predecessor courts of the earlier era, 
the Steinbach court accorded the privacy claims a warmer 
reception.335 Most relevant here is the court’s interpretation of 
the relevant statutes. Although the court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim that the plaintiff 
brought directly under the ECPA on grounds the Act did not 
apply to municipalities,336 it relied on the Wiretap Act and SCA 
to support the plaintiff’s common-law privacy claim.337 
Specifically, the defendants contended that plaintiff could not 
establish an “unauthorized” intrusion upon her seclusion 
because the Village was exempt from liability under the statute 
                                                          
 330. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114–15 (3d Cir. 
2003); see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing Fraser and the SCA). 
 331. Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06 C 4215, 2009 WL 2605283 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009). 
 332. Id. at *1. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at *1–2. 
 335. Id. at *2–7. 
 336. Id. at *2–3. 
 337. Id. at *4–5. 
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as a “provider,” consistent with the first courts to interpret the 
statute in the context of e-mail.338 The court, however, rejected 
that argument, instead interpreting the statute more 
forgivingly to the plaintiff’s interests.339 The court concluded 
that the third party from whom Forest Park purchased internet 
access—and not the city—was the “provider” under the statute, 
thus negating the city’s exemption argument.340 This novel 
interpretive approach facilitated success of plaintiff’s common-
law privacy claim where the narrower interpretations of the 
past would not. Moreover, because many, if not most, 
employers must purchase their network access from some third 
party, this line of reasoning has the potential to negate the 
employer’s use of the “provider” exemption entirely. 
Similarly, the court in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant 
Group also found a way around the statute via an employee-
friendly interpretation.341 As discussed above, the plaintiffs in 
Pietrylo sued their employer, the owner of the Houston’s 
restaurant at which plaintiffs had worked; after they were 
discharged due to what Houston’s deemed inappropriate 
content on a Myspace.com page.342 Along with their common-
law claims, discussed above, the plaintiffs also sued under the 
federal SCA and its state counterpart.343 The defendant-
employer was unable to take advantage of the “provider” 
exemption discussed above since the website was created 
remotely on the Myspace.com platform but argued against 
liability instead on grounds that access was authorized by a 
“user” of the service—a co-employee of the plaintiffs.344 That co-
employee had in fact provided her login information to her 
superiors,345 but, like in Steinbach, the court nevertheless 
found a way around the statutory exemption. The fact that she 
may have felt pressure from her supervisors to share her access 
credentials in order to preserve her job created a fact question 
                                                          
 338. Id. at *5; see supra Part I.B (discussing “early-era” interpretations of 
ECPA and SCA, which typically afforded a defense to employers as providers 
of network services). 
 339. Steinbach, 2009 WL 2605283, at *5. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *3–
4 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008). 
 342. Id. at *1; see supra notes 248–66 and accompanying text (discussing 
Pietrylo). 
 343. Pietrylo, 2008 WL 6085437, at *2. 
 344. Id. at *3. 
 345. Id. at *1. 
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concerning the effectiveness of the authorization she allegedly 
gave.346 Summary judgment was therefore denied, and the 
statutory claim once again survived.347 
2. Progressive Statutory Initiatives 
While courts seem to be according more employee-friendly 
interpretations to the antiquated federal statutory framework, 
state legislatures are beginning to step into the fray as well by 
enacting new statutes that protect the privacy rights of the 
state’s workforce. Indeed, worker privacy is a hot topic in state 
legislatures, as evidenced by the fact that thirty bills 
addressing some aspect of worker privacy were enacted in 2012 
alone, adding new protections in twenty states.348 The 
pervasiveness of legislative reform in the area of workplace 
privacy is further reflected by statistics showing that not only 
are many states considering such laws, but for the last two 
calendar years, state legislatures have enacted more laws 
concerning worker privacy than any other labor-related 
topic.349 
A consistent theme in these state privacy enactments is 
limiting employer access to employee and applicant social-
media accounts.350 As social networking has become pervasive 
in recent years, concerns about worker privacy are moving 
beyond the classic e-mail-access scenario typified in the cases 
discussed above. Traditional privacy protections generally were 
not relevant to employee activity on social network sites, given 
their public nature, but employees nevertheless came to expect 
that their actions on social network sites were relevant only to 
their private lives outside of work, and therefore had no 
bearing on their jobs.351 When it became more commonplace for 
                                                          
 346. Id. at *4. 
 347. Id. at *7. 
 348. John L. Fitzpatrick, Jr. & James L. Perine, State Labor Legislation 
Enacted in 2012, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2013, at 24, 29, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/02/art3full.pdf. 
 349. Id.; see also States Targeted Worker Privacy, Trafficking in Labor 
Legislation Last Year, DOL Reports, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at A-7 
(Mar. 5, 2013) (“For the second consecutive year, the most legislative activity 
came in the worker privacy category, as 30 bills related to the subject were 
passed in 20 states during 2012. The latest figure comes after legislators 
enacted 31 privacy-related laws in 20 states a year earlier, as measured from 
Oct. 1, 2010, to Dec. 31, 2011.”). 
 350. See infra notes 352–54 and accompanying text. 
 351. E.g., Cathleen O’Connor Schoultz, Workers, Employers See Privacy 
Differently; Good Mobile, Media Policy Can Close Gap, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
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employers to request that employees and applicants turn over 
their social network login credentials, state legislatures 
responded by enacting laws prohibiting that practice. Maryland 
was the first state to pass such a law, but numerous other 
states have followed its lead.352 Indeed, according to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, six states enacted 
such laws in 2012,353 ten more joined them in 2013, and such 
legislation had been introduced or was pending in at least 
thirty-six states by the end of the year.354 Based on these 
statistics, it appears safe to say that such protections have 
become the norm, and that nearly every state may eventually 
grant them. 
Some state legislatures have enacted other forms of 
privacy protections directed toward workers. For example, 
Connecticut and Delaware require that employers provide 
written notice to employees before monitoring employee e-mail 
or other Internet activities.355 Colorado and Tennessee protect 
public employees’ privacy by requiring that government 
entities adopt a written policy describing any electronic 
monitoring that may occur.356 Thus, state legislatures are 
protecting the privacy rights of workers in the technological era 
with increasing frequency. 
Federal law may not be far behind on the trajectory 
established by the states. The Password Protection Act of 2013, 
introduced in the House of Representatives on May 21, bears 
some similarity to the now-pervasive state laws restricting 
employer demands for social network passwords, but would 
                                                          
No. 56, at A-13 (Mar. 22, 2012) (“Employees tend to think they are in a private 
zone, especially if they are using their own mobile communication 
devices . . . .”). 
 352. Kathy Lundy Springuel, Maryland Is First State to Restrict Employer 
Demands for Employee, Applicant Passwords, 85 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 
85, at A-12 (May 2, 2012); see, e.g., Michael O. Loatman, Washington Becomes 
Ninth State to Limit Employer Access to Social Media Accounts, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A-7 (May 23, 2013). 
 353. Employer Access to Social Media Username and Passwords, 2012 
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-
media-passwords.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 354. Employer Access to Social Media Username and Passwords, supra 
note 228. 
 355. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 705 (2005). 
 356. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204.5 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-512 
(2012). 
2014] EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN THE TECH ERA 1011 
reach even further by prohibiting employers from requesting a 
password to any computer.357 A similar, narrower bill was 
introduced in 2012.358 The Social Networking Online Protection 
Act was nearly identical to the statutes recently enacted in 
numerous states, and would have prohibited employers and 
universities from mandating access to employee/student e-mail 
accounts and social networking sites.359 Of course, it remains 
unclear whether any such federal legislation will meet with 
success, but the mere fact that such bills have been introduced 
is itself indicative that legislative reform is possible. Likewise, 
although lying just beyond the scope of this Article due to its 
sweeping application beyond the workplace, it is nevertheless 
worth noting here that Congress is also considering revisions to 
the ECPA and SCA that would protect against warrantless e-
mail searches by government authorities, thereby providing 
greater privacy protection to e-mail than the antiquated 1986 
versions of the laws that currently remain in effect.360 Other 
efforts to reform and update the “ancient” ECPA/SCA 
framework have thus far failed, but the recent flurry of state 
legislative activity in the electronic privacy arena suggests that 
                                                          
 357. Password Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 2077, 113th Cong. (2013); Ilyse 
W. Schuman, Federal Bill Would Institute Social Media Password Protection, 
MONDAQ (June 6, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/243622/
employee+rights+labour+relations/Federal+Bill+Would+Institute+Social+Med
ia+Password+Protection (“Specifically, the bill would amend Section 1030 of 
Title 18 of the U.S. Code . . . to make it unlawful if an employer: ‘for the 
purposes of employing, promoting, or terminating employment, compels or 
coerces any person to authorize access, such as by providing a password or 
similar information through which a computer may be accessed, to a protected 
computer that is not the employer’s protected computer, and thereby obtains 
information from such protected computer.’”). 
 358. Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 5050, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 359. Id. § 2(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to require or 
request that an employee or applicant for employment provide the employer 
with a user name, password, or any other means for accessing a private email 
account of the employee or applicant or the personal account of the employee 
or applicant on any social networking website . . . .”). 
 360. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, S. 
607, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1847, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Ryan 
Gallagher, Ancient Electronic Communications Law May Finally Be Updated 
to Protect Email Privacy, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:08 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/03/19/patrick_leahy_introduces_
legislation_to_update_ancient_electronic_communications.html. 
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more sweeping changes at the federal level may be lurking just 
around the corner.361 
C. THE PRIVACY SPHERE CREATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISIONS 
Recent developments in the administrative-law arena also 
deserve mention as consistent with the theme toward greater 
recognition of employee rights in emerging technologies. 
Similar to the state legislation discussed above, the focus here 
lies in employee use of social media. As such, the issues that 
arise in this context do not implicate privacy in the traditional 
sense. But they are no less relevant as a result. The trends 
here, consistent with the judicial decisions, statutes, and 
legislation discussed above, reflect a theme favoring expansion 
of employee rights in modern technological platforms. The law 
implicated is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the 
protections it affords to employees who engage in “concerted 
activity”—i.e., group efforts to question or contest the terms 
and conditions of employment.362 Social media presents 
opportunities for engaging in concerted activity that did not 
previously exist. These new forums give rise to novel legal 
issues, as employers attempt to discern the extent to which 
they can regulate employee conduct that may not occur in the 
physical workplace but nevertheless directly affects it. To that 
end, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is fighting 
this battle on two related yet distinct frontiers—by challenging 
the propriety of disciplinary action taken against employees for 
their communications in social media settings, and by policing 
                                                          
 361. Gallagher, supra note 360. Also consistent with the idea that 
Congress may be headed toward enactment of greater privacy protections for 
employees is a recent request by Republican lawmakers for a survey of e-mail 
monitoring policies applicable to federal workers. See Louis C. LaBrecque, 
Republican Lawmakers Ask OMB for Survey of Federal Worker E-mail 
Monitoring Policies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at A-3 (Mar. 6, 2012). 
 362. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B No. 37, at 2 (2012) 
(“The Board first defined concerted activity in Meyers I as that which is 
‘engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and 
on behalf of the employee himself.’ 268 NLRB at 497. In Meyers II, the Board 
expanded this definition to include those ‘circumstances where individual 
employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well 
as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of 
management.’”). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have 
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”). 
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the content of employer policies that might be construed as 
regulating such communications.363 The NLRB has decided one 
representative case in each of these categories; together, they 
paint a clear picture of the state of the law in this arena. 
The NLRB’s decision in Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. 
perfectly illustrates the hazards of taking disciplinary action 
against employees who communicate with each other about 
their jobs in a social media setting.364 Hispanics United 
employee Mariana Cole-Rivera posted to her Facebook page, 
during non-working hours: “Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that 
we don’t help our clients enough at [work]. I about had it! My 
fellow coworkers how do u feel?”365 Four other employees, none 
of whom were working at the time, responded, each generally 
objecting to the suggestion that they were not doing a good 
job.366 When the Executive Director of the organization learned 
about these Facebook postings, she terminated their 
employment.367 
One of the discharged employees filed a charge under the 
NLRA, contending that the termination of his employment 
constituted an unfair labor practice.368 The General Counsel 
then issued a complaint, alleging that the employees’ 
termination violated the NLRA’s prohibition against 
discouraging concerted activities.369 The administrative law 
                                                          
 363. See, e.g., Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (evaluating unfair 
labor practice charge alleging that employer improperly discharged four 
employees who objected, via Facebook comments, to a suggestion that their 
supervisor found their work to be substandard); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 
N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 1 (2012) (affirming finding of administrative law judge 
(ALJ) that employer’s written policy prohibiting electronic communications 
that “damage the company” unlawfully inhibits protected concerted activity); 
see also Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (2012) (affirming 
finding of ALJ that employer’s “courtesy” rule, prohibiting disrespectful 
conduct and “language which injures the image or reputation of the 
Dealership,” unlawfully prohibits protected concerted activity). 
 364. See Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37. 
 365. Id. at 2. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. at 6; see also id. at 8 (“Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair 
labor practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in Section 7. Section 7 provides that, ‘employees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection . . . .’”). 
 369. Id. 
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judge (ALJ) upheld the charge, concluding that the employees 
were discharged unlawfully for engaging in protected concerted 
activity: 
Employees have a protected right to discuss matters affecting their 
employment amongst themselves. Explicit or implicit criticism by a 
coworker of the manner in which they are performing their jobs is 
a subject about which employee discussion is protected by Section 
7. That is particularly true in this case, where at least some of the 
discriminatees had an expectation that Lydia Cruz-Moore might 
take her criticisms to management. By terminating the five 
discriminatees for discussing Cruz-Moore’s criticisms of HUB 
employees’ work, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).370 
On review, the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings.371 Like 
the ALJ, the Board found no reason to depart from otherwise-
applicable precedents solely on the basis that the mode of 
communication—Facebook—was novel.372 Finding that the 
employees’ comments were protected concerted activity, the 
Board therefore upheld the ALJ’s conclusion that their 
discharge was unlawful.373 
An employer’s knee-jerk response to the Hispanics United 
decision might be to publish a policy broadly prohibiting 
negative comments about the employer on social media, in 
order to avoid the scenario that ultimately transpired in that 
case. Such an approach would not be advisable, however, in 
light of the other frontier on which the NLRB is attacking 
employer regulation of employee social-media use. In Costco 
Wholesale Corp.,374 the other seminal NLRB decision 
addressing social media in 2012, the Board concluded that an 
employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA when it 
published and enforced a policy prohibiting electronic 
communications “that damage the Company, defame any 
individual or damage any person’s reputation, or violate the 
policies outlined in the [company’s employee agreement].”375 
Rejecting the ALJ’s contrary finding, the Board found that 
“employees would reasonably conclude that the rule requires 
them to refrain from engaging in certain protected 
                                                          
 370. Id. at 9. 
 371. Id. at 1. 
 372. Id. (“Although the employees’ mode of communicating their workplace 
concerns might be novel, we agree with the judge that the appropriate 
analytical framework for resolving their discharge allegations has long been 
settled . . . .”). 
 373. Id. 
 374. Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (2012). 
 375. Id. at 1. 
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communications.”376 In other words, because the policy might 
chill employee speech falling within the protections of the Act 
as concerted activity, the policy was itself unlawful. As such, 
not only must employers guard against disciplining employees 
who use social media to communicate with coworkers about the 
terms and conditions of their employment, but they also must 
ensure that such communications are neither prohibited nor 
discouraged. The result is that employers are limited in their 
ability to regulate employee use of social media, thereby at 
least suggesting that employees retain some notion of privacy 
in their use of social media during non-working hours, even 
when such use pertains directly to their job. 
III. JUXTAPOSING THE TRENDS AND HYPOTHESIZING 
FROM THEIR TRAJECTORY 
There can be no doubt that the law of employee privacy in 
workplace technologies is shifting as social norms evolve. The 
first courts to confront issues of employee privacy in emerging 
technologies evinced grave trepidation about creating any new 
rights, clinging firmly to rudimentary conceptions about how 
such technologies worked.377 As the first decade of the new 
millennium drew to a close, though, the tide appeared to 
turn.378 Courts no longer expressed such disdain for claims of 
privacy in workplace technologies, instead opening wider the 
court house doors, inviting more plaintiffs in.379 All this 
transpired in spite of the early-era precedents to the contrary, 
and often in the face of employer policies attempting to take the 
wind out of such claims’ sails even before they could take flight. 
As technology use became increasingly pervasive, social norms 
shifted to reflect that change. 
The preceding detailed exposition of the cases that typified 
the “early” and “modern” eras of technology-based employee 
privacy reveals in lucidity the unmistakable shift in the legal 
response to such claims. In case of any lingering doubt, though, 
a few direct comparisons should quiet any naysayers. And, 
while the trends of the past and present might inform us about 
how far we have come, they do not obviate the path of the 
future. This Part endeavors, therefore, to solidify the stark 
                                                          
 376. Id. at 2. 
 377. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing trepidation of early-era courts). 
 378. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing a trend toward greater recognition of 
employee rights in the modern era). 
 379. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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contrast of the trends established in Parts I and II by directly 
juxtaposing certain early cases against comparable modern 
ones. It then proceeds to draw conclusions about what all of 
this means for what is otherwise a most assuredly uncertain 
future. 
A. A COMPARATIVE JUXTAPOSITION 
Juxtaposition of the trends identified in the preceding 
Parts of this Article reveals in stark fashion a shift from 
reluctance to acceptance in the law of employee privacy rights. 
When technologies were new, courts were extraordinarily 
reticent to carve out or establish employee rights. But as 
technologies have undergone rapid expansion and growth and 
their usage has become more commonplace, so that even the 
very judges and legislators leading the law’s development are 
using these technologies on a daily basis, the reality of the 
shifting social norms can no longer be ignored. A few direct 
comparisons best illustrate this point. 
The first illustrative example juxtaposes the earliest 
published case addressing employee privacy rights in e-mail 
against one of the starters of the modern revolution. Recall 
Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,380 and Pure Power Boot Camp v. 
Warrior Fitness Boot Camp.381 Both cases addressed the 
privacy rights of employees in e-mail, and in both cases, the 
employer either made assurances or published a policy 
purporting to establish (or defeat, as the case may be) those 
rights.382 The contrast between the employers’ approaches is 
alone striking, but the juxtaposition becomes even more glaring 
in light of the decisions the courts made about the employees’ 
privacy. In Smyth, the employer repeatedly assured its 
employees that all e-mail communications were confidential 
and that they “could not be intercepted and used by [the 
employer] against its employees as grounds for termination or 
reprimand.”383 Notwithstanding these assurances, the court 
concluded that employees could not and should not expect any 
                                                          
 380. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see supra 
notes 45–82 and accompanying text (discussing Smyth). 
 381. Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 
2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see supra notes 230–47 and accompanying text 
(discussing Pure Power Boot Camp). 
 382. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 552–53; Smyth, 914 F. 
Supp. at 98–100. 
 383. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98. 
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privacy in their e-mail communications.384 Indeed, the court 
reached this conclusion with very little analysis, finding “no 
privacy interests in such communications.”385 
Pure Power Boot Camp, decided twelve years later, stands 
in stark contrast. The employer there took the opposite 
approach, expressly and directly negating any expectations of 
privacy in employees’ computer communications via a policy 
published in the Employee Handbook: “[E]-mail users have no 
right of personal privacy in any matter stored in, created on, 
received from, or sent through or over the system. This includes 
the use of personal e-mail accounts on Company equipment.”386 
Notwithstanding that policy, however, the court concluded that 
the employees in that case could expect privacy in the e-mail 
messages they sent on their personal web-based e-mail 
accounts, even though they had not only accessed those 
accounts from company equipment but had also stored their 
login credentials there, permitting ready access by anyone who 
could get to the computer.387 
The contrast between these two cases boldly exemplifies 
the shift that has occurred from the early era of workplace 
privacy in emerging technologies, to the modern era of 
pervasive and highly developed technology use. The Smyth 
court, refusing even to engage a discussion about what the 
employee legitimately or reasonably might have expected in 
using his company e-mail, leaped quickly to the conclusion that 
no privacy interests existed, despite the employer’s assurances 
to the contrary.388 The court’s approach evinces great 
trepidation at the idea of establishing privacy rights, and 
perhaps that reluctance is attributable, at least in part, to the 
relative novelty of the e-mail medium at that time. In 1996, e-
mail had just begun to be a pervasive mode of communication 
in American workplaces.389 The judge who decided the Smyth 
                                                          
 384. Id. at 101. 
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 386. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (emphasis omitted). 
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case may well have had little or no experience with it himself. 
That inexperience, in turn, could have contributed to his swift 
conclusion that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in e-mail—
a conclusion that is all the more remarkable given that the 
employer had, at least as alleged by the plaintiff, “repeatedly 
assured its employees, including plaintiff, that all e-mail 
communications would remain confidential and privileged.”390 
The evolution of social norms in the face of rapidly 
expanding use of technology in the workplace over the twelve 
years that intervened between Smyth and Pure Power Boot 
Camp may well explain the polar opposite result reached in the 
later case. Quite unlike Pillsbury, the employer in Pure Power 
Boot Camp expressly and unequivocally declared in a published 
handbook policy that employees should not expect privacy in 
their computer communications and activities.391 Yet, the court 
still found that the employee’s privacy expectations were 
reasonable.392 The fact that the employee sent the subject e-
mail over his personal, web-based e-mail account, as opposed to 
the e-mail account provided by his employer, may have made a 
difference in this aspect of the court’s determination. However, 
the employee also saved his login credentials on his company 
computer, effectively leaving the key in the door and 
facilitating ready access to his otherwise-personal account.393 
Even so, the court still found that the employee could expect 
privacy.394 Shifting social norms may explain this result. By 
2008, e-mail use had become much more pervasive, and it was 
not uncommon for employees to use it frequently for both 
professional and personal purposes.395 Social norms had 
shifted, and the courts seemed to be tracking those changes. 
Other comparisons also illustrate the turn of the tide away 
from the disdain expressed in the early era and toward the 
acceptance of privacy rights in the modern era. The plaintiff in 
McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., another early-era case, went so far 
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 390. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98. 
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have embraced the use of computers, electronic communication devices, the 
Internet, and e-mail.”). 
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as to protect the “personal” e-mail folder on his work computer 
with a password that only he knew on a system devised and 
provided by his employer.396 McLaren argued that the law 
should not treat his password-protected e-mail folder any 
differently than it treated a locked locker in the pre-
technological era.397 The court, however, cast aside the 
password as essentially irrelevant, concluding instead that 
because the e-mails were transmitted over the company 
system, McLaren could expect no privacy in them, password or 
not.398 The court’s decision reflects, therefore, a grave 
reluctance to recognize any privacy rights in emerging 
technologies. 
The McLaren court’s reticence becomes clearer when 
viewed in contrast to the somewhat comparable scenario in 
Pure Power Boot Camp, which netted an opposite result. As 
discussed above, the court in Pure Power Boot Camp found that 
the employee could reasonably expect privacy in the e-mail 
messages sent from, received on, and stored in his personal 
web-based e-mail account, even though he had accessed that 
account from his employer’s computer and had gone so far as to 
save his login credentials there, providing ready access.399 
Despite having readily enabled such access, the court still 
concluded that the employee could reasonably expect privacy in 
the account’s contents.400 This result therefore stands in stark 
contrast to that of McLaren, in which the court swiftly rejected 
the plaintiff’s privacy claims, even though he had protected his 
e-mail with a password. In other words, the early-era employee 
who password-protected his account could not expect privacy, 
but the modern-era employee who enabled ready access by 
saving his password on the computer could. 
Yet another juxtaposition, comparing the courts’ reception 
to traditional causes of action as vehicles for supporting novel 
privacy rights, makes the point here even more emphatically. 
As discussed in Part I above, many of the earliest plaintiffs to 
pursue vindication of privacy rights in emerging workplace 
technologies sought to establish claims under the existing 
                                                          
 396. McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824, 1999 WL 339015, at *5 
(Tex. App. May 28, 1999). 
 397. Id. at *4 (discussing K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 
1984)). 
 398. Id. 
 399. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 559–60. 
 400. Id. 
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common-law framework.401 Indeed, the plaintiffs in nearly 
every seminal early-era case discussed in Part I sought relief at 
least in part on a common-law tort theory like invasion of 
privacy, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, or 
both.402 Each and every such plaintiff failed in that endeavor, 
with the overwhelming majority of the courts swiftly rejecting 
their claims on grounds that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy existed, thereby tolling the death knell of their 
common-law claims, no matter what the underlying theory.403 
In the modern era, by contrast, courts became increasingly 
receptive to such claims. For example, the plaintiff’s claims in 
Steinbach v. Village of Forest Park bore several striking 
resemblances to the claims brought by the early-era 
trailblazers.404 Like her predecessors, Steinbach sued for 
invasion of privacy, asserting both common-law and statutory 
theories.405 Unlike the prior courts, though, this one denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the law could 
support Steinbach’s privacy claims on the facts she had 
alleged.406 The wariness that led the early-era courts to dismiss 
                                                          
 401. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the earliest cases in which plaintiffs 
brought common-law privacy claims). 
 402. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 111, 116 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (considering plaintiff’s claims for wrongful termination and 
invasion of privacy); Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 00-
11243-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (discussing 
plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 
98 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy); Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 26, 1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_
v_Nissan.html (addressing plaintiffs’ claims for common-law invasion of 
privacy and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy); McLaren v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824, 1999 WL 339015, at *4–5 (Tex. App. May 
28, 1999) (addressing plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claims). See generally 
supra Part I.A (discussing cases cited hereinabove). 
 403. See Fraser, 352 F.3d at 111–13 (affirming summary judgment to 
employer on plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim because no public policy was 
implicated due to absence of protectable privacy right); Garrity, 2002 WL 
974676, at *1–2 (dismissing invasion of privacy claim on grounds of no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail); Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100–01 
(granting motion to dismiss wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
claim upon finding employee could not reasonably expect privacy in e-mail); 
Bourke, No. B068705 (concluding that plaintiffs lacked reasonable expectation 
of privacy in e-mail and rejecting invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge 
claims on that basis); McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4 (same). 
 404. Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06 C 4215, 2009 WL 2605283, at 
*1–5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009). 
 405. Id. at *2. 
 406. Id. at *4. 
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before the claims ever left the starting gates therefore gave way 
to not just a willingness but indeed a genuine interest in 
allowing the claims to proceed. 
Similarly, the court in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant 
Group also accorded the plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy and 
wrongful discharge claims a much warmer reception.407 Indeed, 
the court in Pietrylo confronted essentially the same question 
that led to the demise of most early-era claims—whether a 
right to privacy could support a wrongful discharge claim as a 
relevant source of public policy.408 Its answer, however, was 
markedly different. The court stated quite plainly that “[a] 
right to privacy may be a source of ‘a clear mandate of public 
policy’ that could support a claim for wrongful termination.”409 
Based on that conclusion, the court denied the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs 
reasonably expected privacy in their invitation-only website, 
and that a genuine fact issue existed concerning whether the 
employee who granted management access did so 
voluntarily.410 
The change of course in modern-era treatment of common-
law claims provides further support for the theory espoused 
here, that shifting social norms have facilitated an evolution in 
the law, as courts have accorded increasingly broader privacy 
rights in workplace technologies. The role that social norms 
play in this process, however, becomes more evident in light of 
the express recognition by some courts of their significance. For 
instance, in Pietrylo, not only did the court break new ground 
in accepting a right to privacy as a sufficient source of public 
policy, but the court also stated expressly that “expectations of 
privacy are established by general social norms.”411 Similarly, 
the court in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., on the way to 
finding that the plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in e-
mail communications with her lawyer through a personal web-
based account accessed on company equipment, concluded that 
social norms play a vital role in the establishment of the law in 
                                                          
 407. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1 
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008). 
 408. Id. at *6. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. at *7 (quoting White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 2001)). 
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this arena.412 To that end, the court began its opinion with an 
expression about the impact of social norms on workplace 
rights: 
In the past twenty years, businesses and private citizens alike 
have embraced the use of computers, electronic communication 
devices, the Internet, and e-mail. As those and other forms of 
technology evolve, the line separating business from personal 
activities can easily blur. 
In the modern workplace, for example, occasional, personal 
use of the Internet is commonplace. Yet that simple act can raise 
complex issues about an employer’s monitoring of the workplace 
and an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.413 
Those evolving social norms then proved integral in the court’s 
conclusion that the plaintiff’s privacy expectations were 
reasonable, notwithstanding an employer policy attempting to 
defeat any such expectancy.414 
The Supreme Court’s most recent instruction about 
workplace privacy in modern technologies, notwithstanding its 
failure to answer open questions about the governing law, also 
illustrates that social norms play a vital role in the shaping of 
that law.415 Indeed, the majority touted the evolution of social 
norms, and the speed with which the evolution proceeds, as the 
primary justification for its refusal to reach any firm 
conclusions about the law governing employees’ privacy 
expectations: 
The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole 
concept of privacy expectations in communications made on 
electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The 
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in 
society has become clear . . . . Prudence counsels caution before the 
facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises 
that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations 
enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided 
communication devices. 
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and 
information transmission are evident not just in the technology 
itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.416 
                                                          
 412. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 654 (N.J. 
2010). 
 413. Id. at 654–55. 
 414. See id. 
 415. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 758–61 (2010). 
 416. Id. at 759. 
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It was this very reluctance to make any firm declarations 
about the law of workplace privacy expectations that elicited a 
scathing response from Justice Scalia in his concurrence: 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may 
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we 
have no choice. The Court’s implication that where electronic 
privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise 
would . . . ––or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-
specific standards or issuing opaque opinions—is in my view 
indefensible.417 
And thus Justice Scalia returns us to the point at which this 
Article began, with a reference to the prophetic lyrics of Bob 
Dylan: “The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for 
disregard of duty.”418 
B. THE TRAJECTORY OF THE FUTURE 
Having firmly established that shifting social norms are 
turning tides in the law of employee privacy, the question 
remains: What next? Indubitably, new technological frontiers 
that we cannot yet fathom will raise novel issues repeatedly in 
the years to come. Some of these frontiers have already been 
discovered but remain relatively unexplored. Examples include 
online social media, and the use of GPS devices to track 
employee whereabouts and habits.419 How the law should 
respond to these burgeoning frontiers remains in some doubt, 
but the recent evolution in the law suggests at least two 
possible approaches. Because this Article takes a comparative-
retrospective approach, exposing the shift in trends that has 
occurred over the past quarter century, a full exposition and 
hypothesis on how the law should ultimately resolve this 
quandary in the future is beyond its scope. Nevertheless, some 
excursus on the prospects is appropriate. 
The first possible approach is that espoused by the 
majority of the Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon.420 
                                                          
 417. Id. at 768–79 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 418. Id. at 768. 
 419. See generally Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 
468, 473–74 (N.Y. 2013) (holding that GPS tracking of state employee’s car did 
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Much akin to the early-era courts, the majority in Quon 
evinced reluctance and grave trepidation about charting any 
new course in the law of workplace privacy given the rapid 
maturation of relevant social norms.421 Having gone to great 
pains to avoid broaching that subject, though, the Court has in 
effect declared a piecemeal approach.422 Without direct 
instruction from the Supreme Court, litigants and judges are 
left to determine, based on the scattered precedents, what the 
law should be and how it should (or should not, as the case may 
be) respond to social change. This approach has the appeal of 
malleability, permitting the development of the law to track 
society’s progression. But it is not without its shortcomings, 
chief among which are ambiguity and lack of predictability. 
The alternative approach might avoid some of these 
pitfalls, but is also not without imperfections. Justice Scalia, 
dating back to the Court’s early forays into the law of 
workplace privacy, well before the advent of modern 
technology, has long espoused the view that subjectivity in this 
arena is undesirable.423 According to Justice Scalia, subjectivity 
only breeds ambiguity.424 The law should therefore assume 
categorically, he suggests, that privacy interests exist, 
obviating the need for inquiry into subjective expectations.425 
The inquiry therefore need only focus on whether the subject 
search was itself reasonable.426 The appeal of Justice Scalia’s 
categorical approach lies in its relative simplicity. Quite 
obviously, a standard that resolves upon only a single inquiry 
is simpler than a two-step analysis. It is that very 
                                                          
 421. Id. 
 422. Id.; see id. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite the Court’s 
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simplification, however, that casts some doubt upon its efficacy 
and appropriateness. If the detailed exposition in Parts I and II 
above reveals nothing else, it shows that nothing is static in the 
law of workplace privacy. Given the continuing rapid expansion 
of technology and its direct impact on the workplace, it may be 
naive, if not improper, to make the kind of assumptions that 
Justice Scalia’s categorical approach requires. And whatever 
the benefits and shortcomings of these alternate approaches 
may be, it remains clear that no obvious solution has emerged. 
The law continues to evolve along with the social norms, 
though, and perhaps that perfect answer lies just around the 
next bend. 
CONCLUSION 
No one can deny that when it comes to the law of employee 
privacy in workplace technologies, the times they are a-
changin’. In the early era of technology in the workplace, courts 
demonstrated great reluctance to carve out any ambit of 
protection. Almost without exception, the early courts 
concluded summarily that employees had no right of privacy 
whatsoever in electronic communications. The common law 
therefore afforded no relief to aggrieved employees, and the 
antiquated statutes that purport to govern such issues offered 
little respite as well. 
Over the course of the last decade, though, social norms 
have begun to shift as the use of technology has become 
increasingly pervasive both in the workplace and beyond. The 
law may not have kept pace, but it is certainly evolving. 
Although the antiquated statutes remain a sole source of 
protection at the federal-law level, states are responding by 
recognizing common-law protections for privacy rights that did 
not previously exist and enacting new legislation addressed to 
specific privacy concerns. Thus, as society itself becomes more 
immersed in modern modes of communication, the law is 
beginning to recognize that traditional notions of privacy may 
no longer apply. The trajectory of the future is uncertain, but if 
any lesson can be gleaned from the experience of the last 
quarter century, it is that when it comes to privacy interests in 
constantly-changing workplace technologies, the law must 
either begin to anticipate changes or remain flexible to respond 
rapidly. The course of the future is yet unknown, but it is 
certain that it includes progress that the law must address. 
  
*** 
